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SUMMARY 
Starting in January 2019, the Canadian federal government will require all 
provinces and territories to have a carbon pricing policy in place. Due to the 
inevitable increase in costs to industry, carbon pricing reduces the international 
competitiveness of Canadian industries that are emissions-intensive and trade-
exposed (EITE). As a result, most provincial carbon pricing policies, as well as 
the federal government’s carbon pricing backstop, contain complementary 
supports for EITE industries. The goal of these supports is to help Canadian EITE 
firms maintain their competitiveness compared to industries from international 
jurisdictions that do not have carbon pricing. 
When governments price emissions, costs increase for firms and consumers. 
The challenge that EITE industries face, however, is that the prices for their 
goods are set in international markets. Without the ability to pass at least of 
portion of the increased costs on to consumers, EITE industries must absorb 
them against their bottom line. This in turn can result in carbon leakage, where 
the affected industries move elsewhere to avoid the emissions price, or their 
domestic activity declines in response to the higher costs. Carbon leakage leads 
to a drop in the area’s economic activity while the effect of industries moving 
away results in an increase in emissions internationally. In short, carbon leakage 
is a “lose-lose” outcome — it reduces the effectiveness of the carbon pricing 
policy at the expense of local industry. 
Through well-designed EITE support policies, governments can mitigate carbon 
leakage. Specifically, EITE support policies should lower the cost of the carbon 
pricing policy while maintaining the incentive for EITE industries to invest in 
emissions reductions. This paper examines the EITE support policies of the 
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1Canadian federal government, the provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, and 
Quebec, and the international jurisdictions of Australia, California, and the European 
Union. It additionally identifies the best practices that have evolved in jurisdictions that 
have implemented EITE support policies alongside carbon pricing.
EITE support policies are most commonly implemented through the free allocation of 
emissions to firms. Allocations can either take the form of emissions permits, which a 
facility submits in lieu of paying a carbon price, or it can take the form of an emissions 
threshold, up to which a facility can emit at zero charge. In both cases, the two main 
determinants of free allocations, and decision parameters for EITE support policies, are 
a measure of a facility’s output and an emissions intensity benchmark for that output. 
The measure of a facility’s output may be equal to either historical or current production, 
while the emissions intensity benchmark may be defined at the sector- or facility-level. 
Basing allocations on current production — typically referred to as output-based 
allocations (OBAs) — means that facilities only receive support for what they actually 
produce. As a result, they are generally preferred to historical-based allocations.
Emissions-intensity benchmarks are generally preferable to define at the sector level. 
This results in an equal subsidy per unit of output across all facilities within a sector, 
satisfying both efficiency and equity objectives. Sector-level benchmarks mean there 
are also fewer benchmarks to track and update over time, reducing administrative costs. 
The most important consideration for tightening of emissions-intensity benchmarks over 
time — regardless of whether the benchmarks are defined at the sector- or facility-level 
— is that they be independent of a sector’s (or facility’s) actual emissions intensity. This 
ensures anticipation of future benchmarks does not impact a facility’s current investments 
in emissions intensity improvements.
The EITE support policies discussed in this paper exhibit many of these best practices. In 
most cases, however, they are still in need of further fine-tuning. Most notably, a facility’s 
eligibility for EITE support is commonly focused more heavily on an accounting of its 
total yearly emissions, rather than on an assessment of its emissions intensiveness and 
trade exposure. One size does not fit all in this instance. Rather, the success of EITE 
support policies is two-fold, depending not only on how the support is provided but also 
on where it is targeted.
2INTRODUCTION
Numerous countries, including Canada, have implemented emissions pricing regimes. Starting 
in January 2019, carbon pricing is expected to be implemented in all Canadian provinces and 
territories.1 The introduction of carbon pricing within Canada, combined with limited adoption 
elsewhere in the world, has raised concerns about the competitiveness of Canadian industries in 
the presence of increased costs from carbon pricing. As a result, Canadian federal and provincial 
governments have implemented complementary policies designed to mitigate these competitiveness 
concerns. Similar policies are also common in international jurisdictions with emissions pricing. 
This paper summarizes and evaluates existing policies — in Canada and internationally — that 
mitigate the costs of emissions pricing due to competitiveness concerns.
The goal of this paper is to serve as a reference guide for the broad details of policies designed to 
mitigate competitiveness concerns for emissions-intensive and trade-exposed (EITE) industries. 
We review policies in Canada (federally and provincially), California, the European Union, and 
Australia, outlining similarities and differences in policy structure (to whom it applies and the level 
of policy support). We also discuss the pros and cons of the policy choices from the perspective of 
administrative costs, effectiveness in reducing leakage, economic efficiency, and equity. 
This paper informs policy-makers developing EITE support policies by identifying best 
practices in implementation that balance goals of emissions reductions and maintaining domestic 
competitiveness. An EITE policy that balances efficiency and equity and reduces emissions is 
one where free emissions permits are allocated based on current output and emissions-intensity 
benchmarks are defined at the sector level, with annual reductions in the subsidy level independent 
of emissions reductions, similar to Alberta. Importantly, the support should only be provided to 
EITE facilities, not economy-wide.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. We start by providing a brief explanation of the 
rationale and theory behind EITE support policies. This includes a description of output-based 
allocations (OBAs), the most common policy tool used to support EITE industries. We next 
provide an overview of the EITE definitions and support policies used in Canada and compare 
them to definitions and policies in international jurisdictions (California, the European Union and 
Australia). We then narrow our focus to implemented support policies accompanying a carbon price 
and evaluate these policies along the criteria of administrative costs, effectiveness in ameliorating 
leakage, economic efficiency, and equity across and within sectors. We conclude with a brief 
summary of best practices in targeting and implementing EITE support policies.
RATIONALE AND THEORY OF EITE SUPPORT POLICIES
It is useful to briefly explore why specific policy for EITE industries is desirable in addition to 
emissions pricing or other environmental regulations. Greenhouse gas emissions are a global 
pollutant, meaning they have a negative effect on the global environment that is independent of the 
point source of emissions. That is, greenhouse gas emissions in Canada will have the same impact 
on the global environment as emissions of the same greenhouse gases in South Africa.
1 The federal government has indicated the federal carbon pricing backstop will be imposed by January 1, 2019 in any 
province that fails to implement a carbon pricing plan of its own that meets minimum federal standards (Environment and 
Climate Change Canada 2018d). Saskatchewan and Ontario are both challenging the constitutionality of this plan in their 
respective courts of appeal. This may lead to a delay in implementation of the federal carbon pricing backstop in these 
provinces as it is unclear whether the federal government will be able to proceed while the court cases are in progress.
3The goal of climate change or emissions policy is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the 
associated negative impacts of rising global atmospheric carbon concentrations. Jurisdictions 
introducing climate change policy, however, must accept that achieving a reduction in domestic 
emissions will generally result in higher costs for emitters, a large share of which is often local 
industry. 
Faced with increased carbon costs, individual facilities or firms may physically relocate to a lower 
cost jurisdiction, or industry-wide activity (output) may decline as facilities that do not face higher 
carbon costs increase production elsewhere.2 In both cases greenhouse gas emissions will relocate 
from the jurisdiction that implemented the climate policy to one with a weaker policy or none 
at all. This is referred to as carbon leakage. Although carbon leakage is not typically a one-to-
one relationship — that is, a one-tonne decrease in greenhouse gas emissions in the jurisdiction 
implementing climate policy does not typically result in a one-tonne increase elsewhere3 — it still 
negatively impacts local industry while detracting from the objective of the climate policy. This is 
effectively a market failure of climate policy. 
The only way to fully prevent carbon leakage is with global policies that impose equal costs — 
such as a global carbon price or regulations — regardless of jurisdiction. The lack of a global 
carbon price most negatively impacts EITE industries — high-emitting and trade-exposed 
industries that are most susceptible to being placed at a competitive disadvantage in response to 
higher costs of production.4 Lessening both this competitive disadvantage and the accompanying 
potential for carbon leakage is the motivation and justification for EITE support policies. 
There are numerous options for implementing EITE support policies. The challenge for policy-
makers is to identify policies that minimize carbon leakage while simultaneously maintaining 
the emissions-reduction incentive for domestic facilities. A frequent form of this policy support 
is reducing the costs imposed on firms from environmental policies while also upholding the 
emissions price. In economics parlance, this means lowering average costs of production while 
keeping the marginal cost of emissions constant.5
It is easy to argue the most obvious and simplest form of EITE support is an exemption of EITE 
industries from carbon pricing policies. This clearly fulfils the objective of lowering average 
costs: facilities in EITE industries will no longer face the increased costs from emissions pricing. 
It also means, however, that these facilities will not face an emissions-reduction incentive. As a 
result, although there will be no leakage of activity, there will also be no reduction in domestic 
emissions. In addition, implementing pricing in some sectors of an economy but not others will 
result in leakage within a jurisdiction. That is, the exempt sectors will expand their production 
and emissions above what they otherwise would be. Despite its simplicity, an exemption of EITE 
industries from carbon pricing is therefore not desirable when considered within the overall 
objectives of climate policy. 
2 Relocation of activity will only go to jurisdictions with less stringent pricing or regulations, and jurisdictions without a 
binding cap-and-trade system (i.e., total emissions are less than the cap). If the emissions cap in a cap-and-trade system is 
binding, increasing output requires reducing the emissions intensity of all units of output, and there will be no net increase 
in global emissions.
3 A 2014 meta-analysis of 25 carbon leakage studies completed between 2004 and 2012 found carbon leakage estimates 
typically fell in the range of five to 25 per cent with an average of 14 per cent (Branger and Quirion 2014). 
4 In economics parlance, this incomplete pricing (not all emissions are priced) creates a market failure in addition to the 
market failure from emissions.
5 Another mechanism that can be used to reduce carbon leakage is border tax adjustments (BTAs). A BTA typically applies 
an effective carbon price to imported goods by charging an import tax that is equal to the carbon costs that would have been 
incurred if the goods were produced domestically. A BTA may also rebate the carbon cost to domestic producers exporting 
their product for sale in international markets. BTAs are not often used in practice, however, because of concerns about 
their validity under World Trade Organization law (Weber 2015).
4Direct subsidies to EITE industries also lower average costs and, depending on their 
implementation, can maintain the emissions-reduction incentive. Intuitively, the subsidy lowers 
the cost of production, prompting increased production and helping domestic firms maintain 
market share. Direct subsidies can take the form of providing dollar transfers to firms per unit of 
production, subsidizing emissions-reducing technology investments, or providing free emissions 
permits to firms. 
A commonly used mechanism that achieves the policy goal — and the focus of the remainder of 
this paper — is the free allocation of emissions to facilities. This allocation generally takes one 
of two forms. Either it can be distributed directly to a facility as an emissions permit, which the 
facility then submits in lieu of paying a carbon price, or the facility can emit up to the allocation 
without paying the carbon price. The former is most common in cap-and-trade programs, while the 
latter is more common within a jurisdiction with a carbon tax, emissions-intensity benchmarks or a 
combination of the two. In the discussion that follows we use “free allocations” as a broad term that 
covers both mechanisms for allocating free emissions. 
Free allocations can be distributed in two ways: lump-sum to regulated facilities based on pre-
determined firm- or facility-specific characteristics such as historical production, emissions or 
market share (commonly known as “grandfathering”). Alternatively, the allocation can be based on 
current emissions, production or emissions intensity. 
When a facility’s free allocation is based on historical characteristics, current production decisions 
are independent of the level of subsidy. Accordingly, if a facility increases its production then in 
addition to its marginal cost of production, it also faces the full marginal cost of emissions (where 
the cost of each additional tonne of emissions is equal to the prevailing emissions price). Hahn and 
Stavins (2011) show that the final allocation of permits and the overall cost of achieving emissions 
reductions is efficient, regardless of the initial allocation of free permits among firms.6 That is, 
free allocations based on historical characteristics reduce average costs while maintaining the full 
emissions-reduction incentive of the emissions pricing system.
When free allocations are provided according to current characteristics (emissions, production or 
emissions intensity), there is a relationship between these characteristics and the level of subsidy. 
A subsidy related to the current level of emissions will directly lower the cost of emissions. This 
mitigates leakage risk but it also undermines the strength of the emissions price. For example, if a 
facility receives a free allocation for 50 per cent of its emissions — regardless of its production or 
overall emissions level — then the strength of the emissions price is effectively reduced by half. A 
subsidy related to current emissions-intensity has a similar effect. 
In contrast, a subsidy that is a function of current output — often referred to as an output-based 
allocation (OBA) — maintains the full strength of the emissions price as it only rewards firms for 
increasing production. Specifically, with OBAs facilities will typically receive a fixed number of 
emissions allocations per unit of production. Correspondingly, if a facility increases its production 
by one more unit, then it receives additional emissions allocations. This decreases a facility’s 
marginal cost of production and therefore incents the facility to produce more than it would without 
the OBA in place, helping to mitigate carbon leakage.
More importantly, however, the OBA maintains the emissions-reduction incentive of the emissions 
price. If a facility decreases its emissions while maintaining production — equivalent to decreasing 
its emissions intensity — then its emissions allocation does not change. Rather, it receives cost 
savings equal to the full carbon price on its reduced emissions. The facility is therefore incented to 
6 
Hahn and Stavins also explore conditions under which this property does not hold, such as the presence of market power 
and uncertainty. 
5invest in emissions reductions until the marginal cost of decreasing its emissions intensity by one 
additional tonne is equal to the emissions price. In that sense, the outcome is efficient. 
It is worth noting, however, that there are potential costs to OBAs. First, if the allocations are not 
tradable, then the subsidy to output will result in leakage within a jurisdiction when there are 
differential subsidy levels at the facility- or sector-level (Tombe and Winter 2015). Second, Fowlie 
(2012) notes that with a cap-and-trade system and a binding cap, OBAs to trade-exposed industries 
will increase the emissions price and transfer more of the burden of meeting the cap to industries 
not given (or given fewer) free allocations. 
EITE DEFINITIONS AND SUPPORT POLICIES BY JURISDICTION
With one exception,7 all of the jurisdictions we discuss price industrial greenhouse gas emissions 
through either an output-based pricing system (OBPS)8 or a cap-and-trade program. In both cases, 
the primary means of supporting EITE industries is through free allocations. As discussed in the 
previous section, these allocations allow a facility to emit a certain amount of greenhouse gases 
each year at zero cost. Further, if a facility’s allocation exceeds its emissions, then it will receive 
permits that it can either bank for future use or sell to other participants in the emissions market.
In this section we summarize, by jurisdiction, EITE definitions (where they exist) and policies to 
support EITE industries. Note that where possible, we endeavour to use similar terminology across 
jurisdictions in order to facilitate easier comparisons. This sometimes results in deviation from 
the official terminology of a particular jurisdiction. For example, what the Government of Canada 
refers to as an “output-based standard” we refer to as an “emissions-intensity benchmark.” We note 
these discrepancies in footnotes where they occur. 
Depending on the jurisdiction, EITE status may be a simple “yes/no” categorization or it may be 
defined by tiers related to level of carbon leakage risk. As greenhouse gas emissions pricing is a 
relatively new policy in many jurisdictions, it is common for governments to provide support to all 
industries, regardless of EITE status. As a result, not all jurisdictions have a formal EITE definition. 
Where EITE definitions exist, they are consistently characterized by two components — an 
emissions-intensity calculation and a trade-exposure calculation. The emissions-intensity 
calculation estimates the cost burden that an emissions price will impose on industry. A higher 
emissions intensity implies a higher cost burden. The trade-exposure calculation is typically 
interpreted as how open an industry is to trade and competition from other jurisdictions. A higher 
trade exposure generally means that the price for an industry’s product is set globally. It will 
therefore have a more difficult time passing on the carbon costs to consumers and will likely lose 
both profit and market share. 
Key data used in the emissions intensity calculations are direct and indirect industry greenhouse 
gas emissions (measured in CO2-equivalent (CO2e)), industry gross value-added (GVA) or revenues, 
and the CO2e price. Direct emissions measure the greenhouse gas emissions generated by industry 
activity while indirect emissions are emissions generated in producing inputs to the industry, most 
notably electricity and heat. GVA refers to the value of output minus the value of intermediate 
inputs. Revenues, in contrast, are simply equal to the industry’s gross income. Higher emissions or 
7 British Columbia is the only jurisdiction to price industrial emissions through a tax on a facility’s greenhouse gas 
combustion emissions (measured in carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)). 
8 Output-based pricing systems generally tax facilities designated as large emitters on their total emissions, and provide a per 
unit subsidy based on a benchmark emissions intensity (tonnes per unit or dollar value of output). For details on principles 
behind output-based pricing systems, see Dobson et al. (2017).
6a higher emissions price will increase an industry’s measure of emissions intensity, while higher 
GVA or revenues will decrease the measure. 
Key data used in the trade exposure calculations are the gross dollar values of exports, imports 
and domestic production. Higher imports or exports (more trade) will increase an industry’s trade 
exposure measure while higher domestic production will decrease the measure. 
We now turn to a description of emissions pricing policies, EITE definitions and policy supports  
by jurisdiction.
Canada
Federal Government
Background
Starting on January 1, 2019, Canada’s federal carbon pricing backstop will be implemented in 
whole or in part in any province that is either lacking a provincial carbon pricing plan, or which 
has implemented a plan that falls short of the federal government’s carbon pricing benchmark.9 
The backstop consists of two components — a carbon tax and OBPS for industrial facilities with 
emissions of 50,000 tonnes of CO2e or greater in any year after 2013 (Environment and Climate 
Change Canada 2018c). A facility with annual emissions between 10,000 and 50,000 tonnes per 
year in any year after 2016 can apply to opt in to the OBPS starting in 2020 (the second year of 
operation) if it produces the same product as a facility satisfying the mandatory participation 
requirement. Greenhouse gases covered by the OBPS are carbon dioxide, methane,10 nitrous oxide, 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride and nitrogen trifluoride. 
EITE Definition
In its initial description of the forthcoming regulatory framework of the OBPS, released in January 
2018, Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) states the objective of the system is to 
“... minimize competitiveness risks for emissions-intensive trade-exposed industrial facilities, 
while retaining the carbon price signal and incentive to reduce GHG emissions” (Environment 
and Climate Change Canada 2018a). Despite this, ECCC did not initially put forward a formal 
definition for EITE industries. Rather, it appeared that ECCC was treating total emissions from an 
industrial facility as a proxy for EITE. That is, if a facility met the minimum emissions threshold 
for participating in the OBPS, then it was considered EITE and eligible to receive a free allocation. 
In the federal OBPS the free allocation takes the form of an emissions-intensity standard, which 
allows an EITE facility to emit a fixed quantity of emissions at zero charge. 
A more formal process for assessing EITE status was introduced by ECCC in a multi-stakeholder 
presentation in April 2018 (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2018c). Specifically, ECCC 
describes taking a three-phased approach to assessing EITE status (Environment and Climate 
Change Canada 2018e). Phases 1 and 2 are based on formal emissions-intensity and trade-exposure 
calculations. Phase 1 is a static test that completes the calculations using historical data while Phase 
2 is a dynamic test that completes the calculations using forecast data for 2022 that accounts for the 
9 We do not delve into the details of the federal carbon pricing benchmark in this paper as it is not relevant to the discussion 
of EITE industries. Interested readers can refer to Environment and Climate Change Canada’s report Guidance on the Pan-
Canadian Carbon Pollution Pricing Benchmark for full details (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2018b). 
10 Fugitive and vented methane emissions from the oil and gas and transmission pipeline sectors are not covered by the OBPS 
as the Government of Canada has introduced separate methane reduction regulations for these sources. 
7impact of the carbon price. 
The equations ECCC uses to assess emissions intensity and trade exposure are:
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 =  
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 × 0.3 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼 =
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 + 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸
 
The “0.3” in the emissions intensity equation corresponds to ECCC’s initial intention to provide 
free allocations equal to 70 per cent of the national production-weighted emissions intensity of a 
product (discussed in greater detail below). That is, on average, ECCC anticipated facilities covered 
by the federal OBPS would pay the carbon price on 30 per cent of their emissions.11 The carbon 
price used by ECCC in the emissions intensity calculation is an inflation-adjusted $50 per tonne, 
the scheduled national price in 2022.12 
The emissions intensity and trade exposure calculations are combined to define EITE status 
according to Alberta’s criteria (Figure 1). Sectors meeting the criteria for high EITE status in 
either the Phase 1 or 2 assessments are eligible to receive a higher level of carbon pricing support 
(Environment and Climate Change Canada 2018c).
Phases 1 and 2 of ECCC’s assessment were complete as of July 2018. Phase 3 of the assessment 
is ongoing and will be based on a “competitiveness analysis.” Factors that ECCC has identified 
for assessment in this stage include: “evidence of significant facility level impacts, domestic or 
international market considerations, [and] consideration of indirect costs on sectors associated with 
carbon pricing” (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2018e). If significant impacts are found 
then, similar to the Phase 1 and 2 assessments, a sector will be eligible to receive a higher level of 
carbon pricing support.
FIGURE 1 ALBERTA EITE CRITERIA
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 Source: Reproduced based on Figure 3 from Alberta Government (2017b, 15)
Note: Environment and Climate Change Canada has adopted Alberta’s EITE criteria in its proposed approach 
(Environment and Climate Change Canada 2018c).
11 
Note that the actual share of emissions for which a specific facility faces the carbon price will depend on how the facility’s 
emissions intensity compares to the national average. If a facility has an emissions intensity below the national average then 
it will receive an allocation equal to greater than 70 per cent of its emissions. In contrast, if it has an emissions intensity 
above the national average then it will receive an allocation equal to less than 70 per cent of its emissions. 
12 
In the Phase 1 static EITE test all economic figures are adjusted to 2015 dollars. Accordingly, the carbon price used in the 
Phase 1 test is $44 per tonne, the approximate 2015 dollar equivalent of the $50 per tonne price in 2022. 
8Free Allocations
All facilities participating in the federal OBPS will receive a base level of free allocations. The 
federal government intends to calculate free allocations to a facility f in sector s in year t using the 
following formula: 
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 = ∑[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠 × 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡]
𝑖𝑖
 
where i is the index of products produced by the facility, BEi,s is the emissions-intensity benchmark 
for each product i in sector s, and Productionf,s,i,t is the total quantity of each product produced in 
the year (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2018a).13 
Allocations are calculated via an intensity standard. A facility will receive tradable credits for 
performance above the threshold or will be required to make tax payments on emissions above its 
allocation for performance below the threshold. The emissions-intensity benchmarks will be defined 
at the sector level using historical emissions and production data. The original proposed starting 
point in January 2018 was 70 per cent of the national production-weighted average emissions 
intensity of the product.14 Following an engagement period, however, ECCC announced in July 
2018 that the starting point for the emissions-intensity benchmarks will be increased to 80 per cent 
(Environment and Climate Change Canada 2018e). Additionally, it identified four sectors that were 
assessed as a “high competitive risk category” — cement, iron and steel manufacturing, lime and 
nitrogen fertilizers — which are eligible for an emissions-intensity benchmark of 90 per cent.
The technical backgrounder on the OBPS from January 2018 indicated the starting points for the 
sector benchmarks may be further adjusted depending on the emissions intensity of Canada’s 
“best in class” facility (that is, the facility with the lowest emissions intensity), the distribution 
of emissions intensities across all facilities in a sector and competitiveness considerations. 
Although these specific adjustments are not referred to in the July 2018 update, it does note the 
potential for further adjustments to sectors’ or sub-sectors’ benchmarks as a result of the Phase 3 
competitiveness analysis. It therefore seems likely that these specific adjustments (and potentially 
others) are still under consideration.
ECCC has identified 17 initial sectors for which benchmarks will be defined and has completed 
an initial EITE assessment for 16 of them (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2018a, 
2018d).15,16 These sectors vary from NAICS three-digit classification level (sub-sectors) to NAICS 
six-digit level (Canadian industry) and below. Although not clearly stated, based on the proposed 
benchmark metrics, it appears likely that a number of sectors will have multiple benchmarks that 
correspond to specific products within a sector. 
13 Note that “free allocation” and “emissions intensity benchmark” (BE) are our standard terminology. The corresponding 
ECCC terminology is “annual facility emissions limit” and “output-based standard” respectively. 
14 The year for determining the benchmarks’ emissions intensity is still under consideration. 
15 The 17th sector on the initial list is steam/heat. ECCC indicated in April 2018 that a separate emissions intensity benchmark 
will not be assigned for this sector (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2018c).
16 The 17 sectors on ECCC’s preliminary list of benchmarks do not encompass all Canadian sectors with facilities that have 
emissions of more than 50,000 tonnes of CO2e per year (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2017, 2018a). One 
notable exclusion, for example, is automobile and light-duty vehicle manufacturing. Ontario’s withdrawal from the cap-and-
trade system has necessitated development of federal benchmarks for a number of additional sectors, which we expect to be 
forthcoming in fall 2018.
9Annual Adjustment to Free Allocations
Free allocations will change annually in response to a facility’s production. Additionally, the 
federal government has indicated the emissions-intensity benchmarks will decline over time. The 
exact schedule that the benchmarks will follow, however, is still under development. 
Assignment of Free Allocations
Each facility participating in the OBPS is responsible for calculating its annual free allocation. This 
information is submitted to the federal government through a facility’s annual compliance report. 
Indirect Emissions17
The federal OBPS currently plans to include an emissions intensity benchmark for fossil fuel 
electricity generation (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2018c). All sources of fossil fuel 
electricity generation, including utility generation, non-utility generation, on-site cogeneration 
units and standalone cogeneration units will therefore be eligible to receive free allocations. 
As electricity generation is receiving carbon pricing support at its source, facilities purchasing 
electricity will not be compensated for indirect emissions. 
In contrast, the federal OBPS will not include a separate emissions intensity benchmark for steam. 
Rather, emissions associated with steam use will be included in a product’s emissions intensity 
benchmark. There is currently no mechanism in the OBPS to provide carbon pricing support to 
steam exporters. In its multi-stakeholder presentation from April 2018 ECCC indicated that it was 
looking for feedback on this point (Environment and Climate Change Canada 2018c). 
Reviews
An interim review of the OBPS will be completed in 2020 while the system in its entirety will be 
reviewed by the end of 2022. 
British Columbia
Background
British Columbia introduced an economy-wide carbon tax on greenhouse gas combustion 
emissions in 2008. Greenhouse gases subject to the tax are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride.
17 
We include indirect emissions in our discussion of definitions and support policies as some jurisdictions have specific 
treatment of indirect emissions in evaluating whether an industry is EITE and/or determining the free allocations for which 
a facility is eligible.
10
EITE Definition
When British Columbia’s carbon tax was first introduced there was little discussion of providing 
support to EITE industries.18 Rather, in the section on “Carbon Tax Impact on Business” in British 
Columbia’s 2008 budget, the government states: “The low initial tax rate [$10 per tonne] is not 
expected to significantly affect the business community and the five-year phase-in will allow 
time for businesses to adjust. The province hopes that other jurisdictions will also put effective 
mechanisms in place that put a reasonable price on GHG emissions” (British Columbia Ministry of 
Finance 2008, 18).
Although not a specific policy to support EITE industries, it is also notable that the British 
Columbia carbon tax only applies to combustion emissions. As a result, EITE industries do not 
have to pay the carbon tax on any of their industrial process emissions, fugitive emissions or 
emissions from venting.
Concern around the impact of the carbon tax on EITE industries has started to rise in recent 
years, driven by discussions around further increases to the carbon tax (currently at $35 per tonne 
and scheduled to increase by $5 per year through to 2021), evidence that the carbon tax was 
negatively impacting some industries more than others (Murray and Rivers 2015), and the reality 
that other jurisdictions did not move as quickly as anticipated to place a similar price on carbon. 
In 2015, the B.C. Climate Leadership Team19 recommended providing targeted support to EITE 
industries (Climate Leadership Team 2015). More recently, in October 2017, the Government 
of British Columbia announced the appointment of a new Climate Solutions and Clean Growth 
Advisory Council and stated that its mandate will include “... working with industry and the federal 
government to address the competitiveness of emissions-intensive trade-exposed sectors, to help 
them reduce their emissions and continue to thrive economically” (British Columbia Ministry of 
Environment and Climate Change 2017). 
Although British Columbia is now actively discussing the need to support EITE industries, it 
has not developed a formal definition for the sector that is based on quantitative criteria. Rather, 
analysis of EITE is currently done on the basis of the following qualitative criteria:20
1. High greenhouse gas emissions covered by the carbon price which an industry is unable to 
mitigate in a cost-effective manner.
2. Exposure to a competitive import and export market, making an industry unable to pass on 
costs to consumers without loss of market share. 
18 
Although not specific to EITE industries, when the carbon tax was first introduced the general corporate income tax rate 
was lowered from 12 to 11 per cent as part of the government’s promise that the carbon tax would be revenue-neutral. It 
was subsequently lowered further to 10.5 per cent in 2010 and 10 per cent in 2011. The reductions have been undone in 
recent years, however, with the general corporate income tax rate returning to 11 per cent in 2013 and to 12 per cent in 2018 
(Government of British Columbia 2018).
19 The B.C. Climate Leadership Team was formed in early 2015 with the mandate to provide recommendations to the B.C. 
government on how to update its Climate Action Plan. 
20 
These qualitative criteria were provided by British Columbia’s Climate Action Secretariat through personal email 
correspondence in January 2018. 
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Carbon Tax Relief for Industry
The only industry in British Columbia that currently receives any direct relief from the carbon tax 
is agriculture.21 In its 2015 budget, the government of British Columbia also announced a three-
year, $22 million support package to help the cement industry lower its emissions intensity (Cement 
Association of Canada 2015). Notably, the policy did not provide immediate carbon cost relief to 
British Columbia producers, but rather its goal was to lower the future burden of the carbon tax. 
Alberta
Background
Alberta’s Carbon Competitiveness Incentive Regulation (CCIR) came into effect in 2018. The 
CCIR implements an OBPS for large emitters and is part of a new carbon pricing policy in Alberta 
that also includes an economy-wide carbon tax (introduced in 2016). The CCIR replaces the 
Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (SGER), Alberta’s previous carbon pricing regulation for large 
industrial emitters.22
The CCIR applies to all facilities with emissions of 100,000 tonnes or greater of CO2e in any year 
since 2003 (Province of Alberta 2017). A facility with emissions below this threshold can apply to 
opt in to the OBPS if it either competes with a facility that is automatically covered by the CCIR,23 
or if it competes in a “high” category EITE industry (as defined below) and has annual CO2e 
emissions of at least 50,000 tonnes. Greenhouse gas emissions covered by the CCIR are carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride and 
nitrogen trifluoride.
EITE Definition
The equations Alberta uses to determine emissions intensity and trade exposure are:
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 =  
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 
 
𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼 =
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 + 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 
𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸
 
Roughly speaking, full carbon pricing costs are an estimate of the direct industry-level cost of 
Alberta’s carbon pricing policy in the absence of the OBPS. For example, at the 2018 carbon tax 
level of $30 per tonne, the estimate of full carbon pricing costs is $30 multiplied by total direct 
greenhouse gas emissions from the sector. 
21 British Columbia introduced the Greenhouse Carbon Tax Relief Program in 2012. The program allows commercial 
greenhouses to receive a rebate of 80 per cent of the carbon taxes paid on natural gas and propane used for greenhouse 
heating. The amount of the grant in any given year is based on fuel consumption in the previous year. Additionally, starting 
in 2014, farmers were provided with an exemption to the carbon tax on all coloured gasoline and diesel use in on-farm and 
off-road vehicles (Rivers and Schaufele 2015). 
22 
SGER came into effect in 2007 and was Alberta’s first regulation to price greenhouse gas emissions from large industrial 
emitters. 
23 A notable exception to this is conventional oil and gas facilities, which are exempt from the economy-wide carbon price 
until 2023. As a result, these facilities are not eligible to opt in to the CCIR (Alberta Government 2017b, 18). 
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Alberta uses the above emissions-intensity and trade-exposure calculations to define three 
categories of EITE — high, medium and low (Figure 1). For the purposes of the CCIR, only sectors 
meeting the high criteria qualify for treatment as EITE.
Free Allocations
All industrial facilities participating in Alberta’s OBPS, including electricity generators, are 
eligible to receive free allocations. The allocations are implemented through an emissions-intensity 
standard which allows facilities to emit up to a certain threshold of emissions at zero charge. 
Allocations for each facility f in year t are calculated using the following formula:
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 = ∑[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡]
𝑖𝑖
− ∑[𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠,𝑗𝑗 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡]
𝑗𝑗
 
In the first term, i is the index of products produced by a facility, BEs,i is the emissions-intensity 
benchmark for each product i in sector s, and Productionf,s,i,t is the total quantity of each product 
produced in the year. In the second term, j is the index of a facility’s energy inputs, BEs,j is the 
emissions-intensity benchmark for each energy input j, and Importf,s,j,t is the total quantity of each 
energy input the facility purchases from an external supplier in the year. 
The subtraction of indirect emissions from a facility’s free allocation is a consequence of two 
characteristics of Alberta’s OBPS. First, the emissions-intensity benchmarks include indirect 
emissions. This allows for application of the same benchmark to all facilities producing the same 
product, regardless of whether each individual facility produces its energy inputs onsite or purchases 
them from an external supplier. Second, Alberta provides free allocations to energy producers (most 
notably electricity generators). As a result, to prevent double compensation for the same emissions, 
facilities that purchase energy are not eligible for free allocations for their indirect emissions. 
Typically, if there are two or more facilities in the province producing a product, then the 
benchmark is defined at the sector level. Otherwise, the benchmark is defined at the facility level.24 
There are currently 12 sector-level benchmarks, most of which are defined at the NAICS six-digit 
level (Canadian industry) or below. 
The starting point for both sector- and facility-level benchmarks is 80 per cent of the historical 
production-weighted emissions intensity of the product. If a facility or sector competes in an 
EITE industry, then the 80 per cent benchmark may be adjusted upwards to 90 or 100 per cent. 
Additionally, sector benchmarks may instead be set at the emissions intensity of the “best-in-
class” facility or a product-specific approach may be used. For example, in the electricity sector the 
emissions-intensity benchmark is “good-as-best-gas.” 
Assignment of Free Allocations
Each facility participating in the OBPS is responsible for submitting an annual compliance report 
to the Alberta government. The compliance report must include the calculation of a facility’s free 
24 
Facility-level benchmarks are also currently used in five sub-sectors — upgrading, natural gas processing, natural gas 
transmission networks, other fertilizer products and multi-product chemicals — with two or more facilities producing the 
product. For upgrading, natural gas processing and multi-product chemicals, the use of assigned benchmarks is temporary 
and due to a temporary lack of data for defining sector benchmarks. For natural gas transmission and other fertilizers, the 
use of facility benchmarks is expected to continue.
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allocation each year. If a facility emits greater than one million tonnes of CO2e per year, then it 
must additionally submit three interim compliance reports each year and a forecasting report for 
the year ahead. If a facility’s free allocation calculation is greater than its reported emissions for the 
year, then it can include with its compliance report a request to receive the difference in emissions 
performance credits (EPCs) (Alberta Government 2017a, 22). EPCs can be banked for future use or 
sold to other facilities to meet their compliance obligation.
Annual Adjustment to Free Allocations
In 2018 and 2019 a facility’s free allocation adjusts annually in response to current production 
levels only.25 Starting on January 1, 2020 the emissions-intensity benchmarks will tighten at a rate 
of one per cent per year. 
Indirect Emissions
Indirect emissions associated with energy inputs to a product — specifically electricity, heat 
and hydrogen — are included in the estimate of a product’s emissions-intensity benchmark. The 
benchmark does not distinguish between whether these emissions are produced on the same site 
as the product or whether they are purchased from an external supplier. In the latter case, however, 
the indirect emissions associated with energy inputs are subtracted from a facility’s free allocation. 
This accounts for the fact that external energy suppliers are eligible for free allocations for their 
direct emissions.
Reviews
The CCIR includes a provision that allows facility benchmarks to be reviewed and updated at any 
time. Additionally, the current regulations require an interim review to be completed by January 
1, 2021 and a comprehensive review by January 1, 2023, and every five years thereafter. Among 
other elements, the reviews will include consideration of the tightening rate, the carbon price and 
all benchmarks.
Ontario
Background
Ontario implemented its cap-and-trade program in January 2017 and joined California and 
Québec’s joint market in January 2018. In June 2018, Premier-designate Doug Ford announced 
that Ontario would dismantle its cap-and-trade system and withdraw from the joint market 
(Government of Ontario 2018). The regulation implementing the cap-and-trade program was 
subsequently revoked on July 3, one of Ford’s first actions after taking office. The federal 
government has indicated, however, its intention to impose the federal backstop carbon price in 
the province (Crawley 2018). In that case, EITE facilities in the province will be supported by the 
federal government OBPS as previously described.
25 Facilities that were previously regulated under SGER are also eligible for transitional support which starts at 50 per cent of 
the compliance obligation for the facility in 2018 and declines to 25 per cent in 2019 and zero in 2020 (Alberta Government 
2017b, 30).
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Although Ontario’s cap-and-trade program is no longer in effect, as it was previously a fully 
developed and functioning program it is still informative to consider how it provided support to EITE 
industries. The cap-and-trade program required all facilities in the province with greenhouse gas 
emissions of 25,000 tonnes of CO2e or greater to register in the cap-and-trade market. Additionally, 
a facility could apply to register as a voluntary participant in the market if it had emissions of at 
least 10,000 tonnes of CO2e (Ontario Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change 2018a). 
Greenhouse gases covered by the cap-and-trade program were carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous 
oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and nitrogen trifluoride.
EITE Definition
In a scoping document for the cap-and-trade program, published in 2015, Ontario discusses the 
need to provide support to EITE industries to minimize carbon leakage (Ontario Ministry of the 
Environment and Climate Change 2015, 18). It additionally outlines California’s definition for EITE 
(discussed below) and in a separate analysis from consultancy EnviroEconomics, uses California’s 
definition to classify Ontario’s industry sectors according to carbon leakage risk (Sawyer, Peters, 
and Stiebert 2018). 
The scoping document additionally proposes, however, that in the first compliance period of the 
cap-and-trade program (2017-2020), the number of free allocations a facility receives should be 
independent of its carbon leakage risk. This is the approach that was adopted, and accordingly, 
neither the Ontario cap-and-trade regulation, nor any of the documentation on the program, 
provides a formal definition of EITE.
Free Allocations
With the exception of electricity generators and natural gas distributors, all mandatory and 
voluntary participants in Ontario’s cap-and-trade market were eligible to receive free allocations. 
Free allocations were distributed in the form of emissions permits. The number of permits a facility 
received was determined by one of six methodologies, with a facility’s total permit allocation equal 
to the sum of its allocations through each of the individual methods.26 Each method used the same 
general formula for determining a facility’s free allocation. Specifically:
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 
where Bf,t is the base number of free allocations for which a facility f in year t is eligible, AFf,t is the 
assistance factor, and Ct is the cap adjustment factor. 
The base number of free allocations, Bf,t, is the key variable that differs across methods. For 
industrial facilities that were mandatory participants in the cap-and-trade program, we estimate 
that Bf,t was most commonly calculated as a facility’s production multiplied by either a sector- or 
facility-level emissions-intensity benchmark.27 Facility benchmarks were based on historical 
26 The six methodologies are: product-output benchmark, energy use-based, history-based, direct, indirect useful thermal 
energy and bilateral electricity. A full description of each methodology is available in the Methodology for the Distribution 
of Ontario Emission Allowances Free of Charge (Ontario Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change 2017). 
Unsurprisingly, these methods cannot overlap and provide multiple free allocations for the same emissions sources.
27 
Ontario does not indicate the relative prevalence of each methodology for calculating free allocations. However, by 
cross-referencing the list of verified emissions from Ontario facilities in 2016 with the list of products and facilities for 
which sector-level and facility-level emissions-intensity benchmarks have been defined, we estimate the majority of free 
allocations are distributed by this method (Ontario Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change 2017, 2018b). 
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emissions and production data. The methodology for estimating sector benchmarks, in contrast, 
is not specified. There are currently nine sector benchmarks which are generally defined at the 
NAICS six-digit level (Canadian industry) and below. 
Although not as common, for a small number of facilities Bf,t was independent of current 
production and equal either to a facility’s historical or current absolute level of emissions. Last, 
for voluntary participants in the cap-and-trade program Bf,t was most commonly calculated as a 
function of a facility’s energy inputs and their corresponding emissions intensities. 
The assistance factor (AFf,t ) is the variable that granted the government the flexibility to adjust 
a facility’s free allocation in response to its EITE status. As noted earlier, however, in the first 
compliance period free allocations were assigned independently of an industry’s carbon leakage 
risk. Accordingly, AFf,t was equal to one for all facilities. This means that prior to the application of 
the cap adjustment factor, a facility was eligible to receive 100 per cent of its base number of free 
allocations in every year from 2017 through to 2020.
Finally, the cap adjustment factor ensured the distribution of free allocations declined in line with 
the overall cap on Ontario’s emissions. It started at unity in 2017 and subsequently declined by 
approximately 4.57 percentage points each year through to 2020. 
Assignment of Free Allocations
Facilities were required to submit an annual application to receive free allocations. The Ministry of 
the Environment and Climate Change subsequently distributed allocations to all eligible facilities. 
When applicable, the initial allocation of emissions was based on data (emissions, production or 
energy inputs) from two years prior. The allocation was subsequently adjusted when the final data 
for the year were available. These data were submitted in a facility’s annual emissions report, 
which was required under Ontario’s Quantification, Reporting and Verification of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions regulation.28
Annual Adjustment to Free Allocations
Depending on the methodology used to assign free allocations, the allocation may have changed 
annually in response to a facility’s production, energy inputs or absolute level of emissions. 
Additionally, starting in 2018, for all facilities the free allocation would be reduced each year by the 
cap adjustment factor referenced above.
Indirect Emissions
The treatment of indirect emissions in Ontario is not entirely clear. In particular, there is no 
reference to whether indirect emissions were accounted for in sector-level benchmarks. Facility-
level benchmarks would sometimes be based on a facility’s total emissions, which presumably 
included emissions associated with energy inputs produced at a facility, and on other occasions was 
based only on emissions associated with a particular product. 
If a facility purchased heat or electricity from an external supplier, then it was eligible under 
specific conditions for free allocations associated with its indirect emissions. First, the external 
28 This regulation was revoked by the Ontario government on August 1, 2018. It is currently unclear what, if any, facility-level 
greenhouse gas emissions reporting requirements Ontario will have moving forward. 
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supplier of the heat or electricity could not receive free allocations for its direct emissions. Second, 
in the case of electricity, the electricity had to be distributed directly from the external supplier to 
the facility that was purchasing it. Indirect emissions associated with electricity distributed through 
Ontario’s grid were not eligible for free allocations. 
Reviews
The Ontario cap-and-trade regulation included no formal reference to a required review of the 
regulation or its components. However, the values of the assistance factor and the cap adjustment 
factor were only defined through to the end of 2020.
Québec
Background
Québec implemented its cap-and-trade program in January 2013 and linked its market with 
California in late 2014. All industrial facilities in the province with annual CO2e emissions of 
25,000 tonnes or greater are required to register in the cap-and-trade market. Facilities that do 
not have a regulatory requirement to participate in the market have the option of registering as 
voluntary participants if they have annual emissions of at least 10,000 tonnes of CO2e. Greenhouse 
gases covered by the cap-and-trade program are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur 
hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and nitrogen trifluoride.
EITE Definition
Québec’s cap-and-trade regulation specifies a list of industries that are eligible to receive free 
allocations (Province of Québec 2017). In the technical overview of its cap-and-trade program, 
Québec notes the objective of the allocations is to “... mitigate the repercussions of the C&T system 
on the competitiveness of Québec’s industrial sector and avoid carbon leakage” (Gouvernement 
du Québec 2014, 8). There is no indication of how the list of industries eligible for support was 
developed, however, and no reference to, or definition of EITE, in the cap-and-trade regulation. 
Rather, the support seems to be broadly extended to nearly all industrial facilities that participate in 
the cap-and-trade program.
Free Allocations
Mandatory and voluntary participants in Québec’s cap-and-trade program in the mining and 
quarrying, electricity generation, manufacturing, or steam and air-condition supply industries are 
eligible for free allocations.29 Free allocations are distributed as emissions permits. Allocations for 
each product are based on an emissions-intensity benchmark that is defined either at the facility or 
the sector level.
29 Electric power generation is included on the list of industries eligible for free allocations but facilities are assessed on an 
individual basis and are only eligible if they sell power under a fixed price contract that was established prior to January 1, 2008. 
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The annual free allocation to a facility f in year t producing product i with a facility-level 
emissions-intensity benchmark is:
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
where BEf,i,t is the facility’s emissions-intensity benchmark for the product i and Productionf,s,i,t 
is the facility’s annual output. In 2013 and 2014 — the first two years of Québec’s cap-and-trade 
program — BEf,i,t was roughly equal to 80 per cent of the facility’s historical emissions intensity 
of production. Starting in 2015, the value of BEf,i,t declines linearly towards a target facility-level 
emissions intensity for 2020.30 The target level is again a function of the facility’s historical 
emissions intensity.31
By contrast, the annual free allocation to a facility producing product i with a sector-level 
emissions-intensity benchmark is:
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = max{𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,2020} × 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
where Productionf,s,i,t is defined the same as above. BEf,i,t is again equal to roughly 80 per cent of the 
facility’s historical emissions intensity of production in 2013 and 2014. Starting in 2015, however, 
the value of BEf,i,t declines linearly towards BEs,i,2020, which is the target emissions intensity for 
the sector in 2020. This value is defined as a function of the sector’s historical emissions.32 This 
allocation rule effectively transitions Québec to Alberta’s allocation rule, where the default 
benchmark for a facility is the sector’s emissions intensity.
Notably, the inclusion of the “max” function in the free allocation equation means that if a facility’s 
value of BEf,i,t in 2013 is less than the target emissions intensity for the sector in 2020, then the 
facility’s free allocation in all years will be based on the sector target. That is, the most efficient 
facility (facilities) in a sector is (are) effectively rewarded for having a lower emissions intensity 
relative to its (their) peers. 
There are currently only three sector-level benchmarks in Québec. The sectors are defined at the 
NAICS six-digit level (Canadian industry) and below. 
Assignment of Free Allocations
The Ministère du Développment durable, de l’Environnement et de la Lutte contre les changements 
climatiques calculates and distributes free allocations to mandatory cap-and-trade participants. 
Seventy-five per cent of the estimated annual allocation to a facility, calculated using facility 
production data from two years prior, is placed into the facility’s emissions account at the start 
of each year. The free allocation is subsequently adjusted when final production data for the year 
are submitted. These data are submitted in a facility’s annual emissions report, as required under 
Québec’s Regulation Respecting Mandatory Reporting of Certain Emissions of Contaminants into 
the Atmosphere.
30 For example, if a facility’s starting benchmark emissions intensity is BEf,i,2013 = BEf,i,2014 = 20 and its target emissions 
intensity is BEf,i,2020 = 14 then its benchmark emissions intensity from 2015 through to 2019 will decline by one unit per year. 
That is, BEf,i,2015 = 19, BEf,i,2016 = 18, etc. 
31 
The target emissions intensity is roughly equal to 80 per cent of the minimum of two possible historical emissions 
intensities. These are: (i) 95 per cent of the facility’s minimum annual emissions intensity from 2007 to 2010; or (ii) 90 per 
cent of the cumulative emissions intensity of the facility from 2007 to 2010. 
32 
The 2020 sector target emissions intensity is defined analogously to the 2020 facility target emissions intensity described in 
footnote 31 but uses sector-level emissions in place of facility-level emissions. 
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Annual Adjustment to Free Allocations
Free allocations to a facility adjust annually both in response to a facility’s production level and 
in most cases, its emissions-intensity benchmark. The tightening rates for the emissions-intensity 
benchmark are specific to each facility and are determined by the facility’s starting emissions-
intensity benchmark in 2013, and either the facility’s or the sector’s target emissions-intensity 
benchmark in 2020. The 2013 and 2020 target benchmarks are each a function of a facility’s or 
sector’s historical emissions intensity. 
Indirect Emissions
There is no reference to indirect emissions in Québec’s cap-and-trade regulation and indirect 
emissions do not appear to be included in the calculation of emissions-intensity benchmarks. The 
lack of attention to indirect emissions likely stems from the fact that 99 per cent of Québec’s total 
electricity generation — and 96 per cent of electricity generation from industrial facilities — was 
from renewable sources in 2016 (Statistics Canada 2018). Industrial facilities are therefore unlikely 
to face significant energy input cost increases as a result of the cap-and-trade market. 
Reviews
The Québec cap-and-trade regulation includes no formal reference to a required review of the 
regulation or its components. However, the emissions-intensity benchmarks are currently only 
defined through to the end of 2020. At a minimum these components will therefore need to be 
revisited and updated within the next two years. 
California
Background
California implemented a cap-and-trade program for greenhouse gas emissions in 2013 and linked 
its market with Québec in late 2014. All industrial facilities with annual emissions of 25,000 tonnes 
of CO2e or greater in any year since 2009 are required to participate in the program. Facilities 
with emissions below this threshold can apply to opt in to the program. Greenhouse gases covered 
by the cap-and-trade program are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, 
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, nitrogen trifluoride and other fluorinated greenhouse gases 
(California Air Resources Board 2017b, 25). 
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EITE Definition
The equations California uses to determine emissions intensity and trade exposure33 are:
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 =
𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 (𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝐼𝐼)
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 ($𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)
 
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 =
𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸
𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸
 
A notable characteristic of California’s emissions-intensity measure is that it does not include the 
carbon price. Rather, the only term in the numerator of the equation is direct industry emissions. 
This is in contrast to the numerator of Alberta’s emissions-intensity measure which estimates the 
industry-level cost of its carbon pricing policy by multiplying direct industry emissions by the 
carbon price. California’s approach is likely due to the fact that it does not have a set carbon price. 
Rather, the price that facilities must pay for permits is determined by an auction and is not known 
when the emissions intensity calculation is completed. 
Similar to Alberta, California uses the emissions-intensity and trade-exposure calculations in 
combination to define three levels of leakage risk — high, medium and low (Figure 2). The initial 
intent of identifying the level of leakage risk was to determine the level of support that industries 
would receive to ease the financial burden of increasing costs attributable to the state’s cap-and-
trade program (California Air Resources Board 2010). In practice, support policies have been 
largely independent of leakage risk. 
FIGURE 2 CALIFORNIA EITE CRITERIA
Em
iss
io
ns
 In
te
ns
ity
  
(t
 o
f C
O
2e
/$
M
 G
V
A
) > 5,000 
High High 
1,000 - 4,999 
Medium  Medium 
 
100 - 999 
Low   
< 100 
Very Low Low 
 < 10% 
Low 
10% - 19% 
Medium 
> 19 % 
High 
Trade Exposure 
 Source: Reproduced based on Table 1 from California Air Resources Board (2013a, 4).
33 
California’s official equation for trade exposure lists “Shipments” in place of “Production” in the denominator of the trade-
exposure equation. Shipments are defined as “... products manufactured, plus receipts for services rendered, approximately 
revenue” (California Air Resources Board 2010, 9). 
20
Free Allocations 
With the exception of electricity generators, the majority of industrial facilities participating in 
California’s cap-and-trade program on a mandatory or opt-in basis are eligible to receive free 
allocations. Allocations are distributed as emissions permits and are most commonly calculated 
using the following formula:
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
 
where i is the index of products produced by facility f in year t, Productionf,s,i,t is the total quantity 
of the product produced by the facility, BEs,i is the emissions-intensity benchmark for the product, 
AFs,i,t is the assistance factor and Cs,i,t is the cap adjustment factor. 
The emissions-intensity benchmark is defined at the sector level (s) using historical emissions and 
production data. The default value is 90 per cent of the state-wide production-weighted average 
emissions intensity of the product. However, if this value falls below the best-performing facility 
in the state — that is, the facility with the lowest emissions intensity — then the emissions 
intensity of this facility is instead used as a “best-in-class” benchmark. Sectors are typically 
defined at the NAICS six-digit level (U.S. industry) and below, with a large number of sectors 
having separate emissions-intensity benchmarks for different products. California currently has 83 
benchmarks in total.
As was the case in Ontario, EITE status is supposed to impact a facility’s free allocation primarily 
through the value of the assistance factor (AFs,i,t ).
34 To aid with the transition to the cap-and-
trade program all industries were originally assigned an assistance factor of one in the first two 
compliance periods (2013-2014 and 2015-2017). For the third compliance period (2018-2020) the 
current regulation assigns an assistance factor of one only to industries with a high risk of carbon 
leakage. For industries with a medium and low risk of carbon leakage, the assistance factor 
declines to 0.75 and 0.5 respectively.35 This change is at best temporary, however, as starting in 
2021 the assistance factor will again revert to one for all industries.36 Further, the California Air 
Resources Board (CARB) is considering amending the current regulation so that the declines 
to 0.75 and 0.5 are retroactively eliminated (California Air Resources Board 2017a, 10). In this 
scenario, all industries — regardless of EITE status — will be assigned an assistance factor of one 
in all compliance periods. 
The cap adjustment factor (Cs,i,t ) ensures the number of free allocations declines in step with the 
overall decline in California’s emissions cap. For a subset of EITE industries with both a high 
leakage risk and a large share of emissions from industrial processes, the cap adjustment factor 
declines at a slower rate. 
34 We note that the order of our discussion, which places Ontario ahead of California, may make it appear as though 
California’s system was based on Ontario’s. In actuality it is the opposite scenario. California’s system was developed and 
implemented between 2006 and 2012, well before Ontario announced its intention to develop a cap-and-trade market in 
April 2015. Ontario announced at the outset its plan to link its market with Québec and California and its market design 
subsequently drew on numerous aspects of California’s system. 
35 The current assistance factors are the result of an amendment to the original cap-and-trade regulation. Originally, the 
assistance factor was set at one for all industries in the first compliance period only. For industries at a medium and low 
risk of carbon leakage the assistance factor was subsequently scheduled to decrease to 0.75 and 0.5 respectively in the 
second compliance period, and then 0.5 and 0.3 respectively in the third. CARB noted the reason for extending the higher 
assistance factors through the second compliance period was to “... ensure consumers are not negatively impacted by the 
Program while providing time for industry to transition to lower-carbon production methods” (California Air Resources 
Board 2013b, 26).
36 This provision was part of Assembly Bill 398, the legislation extending California’s cap-and-trade program through to 2030, 
which was passed by the California State Assembly in July 2017 (State of California 2017). 
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Assignment of Free Allocations
CARB annually distributes free allocations to eligible facilities. A facility’s original allocation for 
an upcoming year is based on its production from two years prior. The allocation is subsequently 
adjusted when final production data for the year are available. These data are submitted in 
a facility’s annual emissions report as required under CARB’s Mandatory Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Reporting regulation. 
Annual Adjustment to Free Allocations
Free allocations adjust annually in response to a facility’s production and the cap adjustment 
factor. For the majority of industries, the cap adjustment factor is scheduled to tighten at 1.8 per 
cent annually from 2013 to 2020 and at 3.4 per cent annually from 2021 to 2030. For the small 
subset of EITE industries eligible for a less aggressive cap adjustment factor, the tightening rate is 
approximately one per cent from 2013 to 2020. The tightening rate post-2020 for these industries 
has not yet been set, although it will continue to be lower than the standard rate. 
Indirect Emissions
Indirect emissions associated with heat purchased, as well as heat and electricity sold, are 
included in the calculation of an industry’s emissions-intensity benchmark. In the former case, 
facility emissions are adjusted upwards — to reflect the indirect carbon costs associated with heat 
purchased — while in the latter case they are adjusted downwards — to reflect the cost recovery 
available to a facility when selling heat or electricity.
Indirect emissions associated with purchased electricity are not included in the emissions-intensity 
benchmarks. Instead, California cushions potential electricity price increases by distributing free 
allocations to electricity distribution utilities and requiring that the value of these allocations is 
passed down to ratepayers (California Air Resources Board 2017b, 195). 
Reviews 
CARB does not appear to have a set schedule for reviewing and updating its EITE list or its 
emissions-intensity benchmarks. Rather, changes appear to occur on an ad hoc basis, typically 
driven either by the availability of improved data or at the request of industry.
European Union
Background
The EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) — a cap-and-trade program — has been in effect 
since 2005. Participating countries in the ETS include the 28 EU members, as well as Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, and Norway, which joined in 2008. Unlike the North American emissions pricing 
markets that determine participation based on emissions thresholds, the EU tends to use a 
combination of capacity and output thresholds, many of which are industry-specific. The most 
common is a threshold of 20 MW for the combined thermal energy input of all technical units at a 
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facility (European Commission 2014b).37,38 Carbon dioxide is the primary greenhouse gas covered 
by the ETS. Nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons are also covered in specific sectors.
Starting in 2013 the EU introduced to the ETS an EITE definition and consistent rules for 
determining free allocations to facilities in all participating countries. If an industry meets the 
criteria outlined in the EITE definition, then it is added to the EU’s carbon leakage list and facilities 
in the industry are eligible to receive the maximum level of carbon pricing support.39 Both the 
definition and rules have recently been updated and new versions will be implemented starting in 
2021. We provide an overview of both definitions in the discussion below. 
EITE Definition
The EU’s original equations for measuring emissions intensity and trade exposure were:
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 =
𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 + 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
 
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 =
𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸
𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸
 
In the emissions-intensity calculation, direct costs were defined as:
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐 = 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐 ×  𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝐷𝐷 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝐷𝐷 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 
where the auctioning factor is the share of industry emissions that are subject to the carbon price 
if the industry is not included on the carbon leakage list. This accounts for the fact that even 
industries not deemed at risk of carbon leakage are eligible for carbon pricing support. Also of note 
in this equation is the inclusion of the CO2e price. As is the case in California, the EU carbon price 
is not fixed and is determined in the auctions for emissions permits. As the emissions-intensity 
calculation is completed prior to the auctions taking place, it requires an assumption or forecast as 
to what the prevailing emissions price is likely to be. 
Indirect costs are defined as:
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 𝐶𝐶𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 × 𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 × 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 
where electricity consumption is an estimate of electricity use at the industry level and the emission 
factor for electricity is a measure of the emissions intensity of electricity generation in the EU. 
37 Technical units can include boilers, burners, turbines, heaters, furnaces, incinerators, calciners, kilns, ovens, dryers, engines, 
fuel cells, chemical looping combustion units, flares and thermal or catalytic post-combustion units. Units with a thermal 
input under 3 MW and those that use exclusively biomass are excluded from the calculation of the 20 MW threshold. 
38 It is challenging to translate the 20 MW thermal energy input threshold into a corresponding annual emissions threshold as 
the emissions generated will depend, among other things, on the type of fuel that is used in the facilities, the efficiency of 
the units and how many hours per year the facilities operate. Data on verified emissions and free allocations in the EU ETS 
show, however, that numerous facilities with emissions below 1,000 tonnes per year have surpassed the 20 MW threshold 
and correspondingly receive free allocations. It is worth noting, however, that a member state may exclude a facility from 
the ETS if the facility’s annual emissions fall below 25,000 tonnes of CO2e and if its combined thermal energy input from 
all installations is less than 35 MW. In this case, however, the member state must also be able to demonstrate the facility is 
subject to other emissions-reductions measures that will achieve an outcome equivalent to participation in the ETS.
39 As outlined later in the main text, facilities operating in industries not on the carbon leakage list are also eligible to receive 
carbon pricing support but at a reduced rate. Support to industries not on the carbon leakage list will not be fully phased out 
until 2030 (European Commission 2018, 8).
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The EU is the only jurisdiction that uses a simple “yes/no” categorization for carbon leakage risk 
(Figure 3). The carbon leakage assessment is primarily based on the quantitative criteria outlined 
above. If an industry fails to meet the quantitative criteria, however, then it can also be added to the 
carbon leakage list following a qualitative assessment. 
FIGURE 3 EU EITE CRITERIA FOR PHASE 3 OF THE ETS (2013-2020)
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As noted above, the EU will implement a new EITE definition starting in 2021. Specifically, it has 
updated both the emissions-intensity calculation and carbon leakage criteria. The new emissions-
intensity calculation is: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 =
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 (𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝐼𝐼)
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 (€)
 
This calculation is described in an amendment to the directive implementing the ETS (European 
Commission 2018, 43). The amendment does not specify whether the measure of emissions 
includes only direct emissions from an industry, or if it will continue to be the sum of direct and 
indirect emissions. 
The new carbon leakage criterion outlined in the amendment is:
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 × 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼 ≥ 0.2 
Sectors can additionally be added to the carbon leakage list based on an evaluation of qualitative 
criteria if the above calculation is greater than or equal to 0.15, or if the emissions-intensity 
calculation exceeds 1.5 (European Commission 2018, 43) 
Generally speaking, the new EITE criterion removes from the carbon leakage list industries 
that are currently on the list based solely on high trade exposure or high emissions intensity. 
Conversely, industries that were previously borderline when evaluating the combination of both 
criteria will now, in most cases, automatically be classified as at risk of carbon leakage. 
Free Allocations
The large majority of industrial facilities in the EU are eligible for free allocations, which are 
distributed as emissions permits. The only major exception is electricity generators, which can 
receive free allocations for emissions associated with heat production but not electricity generation 
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(in most cases).40 The standard formula for determining the free allocation to a facility f in sector s 
in a particular year, t, is:
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 = ∑ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑓𝑓,𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖 × 𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡
𝑖𝑖
 
where i is the index of products produced by a facility, Productionf,s,i is the historical quantity of the 
product produced by the facility, BEs,i is the emissions-intensity benchmark for the product, AFs,i,t is 
the assistance factor and Ci,t is the cap adjustment factor.
41 
In comparison to other jurisdictions, the EU’s current free allocation methodology is based on 
an historical baseline and does not change in response to current production. Starting in 2021, 
however, the production level used in the free allocation formula will update if a facility’s rolling 
average of production over a two-year period differs from its historical baseline by greater than  
15 per cent. 
The emissions-intensity benchmark is defined at the sector level and uses historical facility-level 
emissions-intensity data. Specifically, the emissions intensity for each facility producing the 
product is calculated and the sector benchmark is set equal to the unweighted average emissions 
intensity of the top 10 per cent of these facilities (i.e., those with the lowest emissions intensity). 
The benchmarks will be updated to reflect industry-specific technological improvements in 2021 
and 2026. The EU currently has 52 emissions-intensity benchmarks, which are largely defined at 
the equivalent of the NAICS six-digit level (Canadian/U.S. industry) and below. 
The assistance factor is again the variable that adjusts a facility’s free allocation in response to 
the carbon leakage risk of its industry. Sectors on the carbon leakage list are always assigned an 
assistance factor of one. In contrast, if a sector is not on the carbon leakage list, then it receives an 
assistance factor of 0.8 in 2013, declining linearly to 0.3 in 2020. It remains at 0.3 through to 2026 
and then declines linearly to reach zero in 2030. 
As was the case in California and Ontario, the cap adjustment factor ensures the total number of 
free allocations in the EU declines in line with the overall cap on emissions. A key difference, 
however, is that the EU does not have a pre-determined schedule for the cap adjustment factor. 
Rather, it has a pre-determined cap on the total number of free allocations that can be distributed 
each year. This cap, divided by the total number of requested free allocations, then determines 
the cap adjustment factor each year. Starting in 2021, however, the EU is introducing additional 
flexibility to the free allocation cap with the aim of reducing the use of the cap adjustment factor. 
Assignment of Free Allocations
Free allocations are annually distributed from the European Commission to countries participating 
in the ETS. These participating countries then in turn distribute their share of the free allocations 
to facilities within their respective jurisdictions. As each facility’s allocation is based on historical 
production data, the allocation only needs to be calculated and assigned on a single occasion.
40 The cap-and-trade directive allows an exception to this in eight countries that have joined the EU since 2004 — Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. Each of these countries is allowed to assign 
a limited number of free emission-permit allocations to power plants as a form of transitional assistance. In return for 
this allowance, each country must also make an investment, equal to the value of these allocations, in modernizing the 
electricity sector (European Commission 2016, 3). Additionally, electricity generators in any country are eligible to receive 
free allocations for heat production.
41 Note that “assistance factor” and “cap adjustment factor” are our standard terminology. The EU terminology for these 
variables is “carbon leakage factor” and “correction factor” respectively. 
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Annual Adjustment to Free Allocations
From 2013 to 2020 free allocations to facilities in an industry on the carbon leakage list adjust on an 
annual basis in response to declines in the cap adjustment factor. Although the cap adjustment factor 
does not have a specific schedule, it is forecast to decline by just over one per cent per year from 
2013 to 2020 (European Commission 2015a). For facilities in industries not on the carbon leakage 
list, free allocations adjust both in response to the cap adjustment factor and the assistance factor.
Starting in 2021, free allocations to all facilities will adjust in response to production changes of 
greater than 15 per cent. The cap adjustment factor may also continue to play a role in adjusting 
free allocations post-2021, although as previously noted, the EU is aiming to minimize its use in 
this period. 
In both 2021 and 2026, free allocations will additionally adjust in response to updates to the 
emissions-intensity benchmarks for all industries. Relative to the original benchmark value, the 
range of possible tightening rates is three to 24 per cent in 2021, and an additional one to eight per 
cent in 2026. The exact values will reflect realized efficiency improvements in each industry.
Last, when the new EITE definition is implemented in 2021, a large number of industries may find 
themselves no longer on the carbon leakage list. As a result of being removed from the list, their 
assistance factors will fall from 1.0 to 0.3, reducing free allocations by 70 per cent. 
Indirect Emissions
The EU’s current EITE definition includes indirect emissions in its emissions-intensity calculation. 
High indirect emissions therefore increase the likelihood of an industry being classified as at risk of 
carbon leakage. 
The emissions-intensity benchmarks include direct and indirect emissions from measurable heat 
used in the production process (European Commission 2014a). In contrast, indirect emissions 
associated with electricity generation are not included in the benchmark. Further, direct emissions 
associated with electricity that is generated on site, as well as heat that is exported, are subtracted 
from the emissions-intensity estimate of a facility. Compensation for increased costs related to 
electricity purchases remains largely country-specific, with the ETS directive stating that, subject 
to EU-wide guidelines, countries may adopt financial measures to support industries deemed at risk 
of carbon leakage from carbon costs embedded in electricity prices (European Commission 2014b).
Reviews
The EU’s EITE definition was first introduced in 2009 in an amendment to the directive 
implementing the ETS. The amendment required an initial carbon leakage list to be released by 
December 31, 2009, and subsequent lists to be released every five years thereafter. The most recent 
amendment to the ETS directive removes this requirement. Details on future versions of the carbon 
leakage list, which will employ the new EITE definition, will likely be announced by the end of 2019. 
Last, the EU ETS directive also includes a provision for reviewing the competitiveness and carbon 
leakage risk of manufacturing industries following the EU becoming a signatory to any new 
international agreements on climate change. This provision allows for decreasing support to EITE 
industries if competing international jurisdictions implement comparable carbon pricing policies.
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Australia
Background
By its own admission, Australia has had an inconsistent approach to climate policy (Talberg, Hui, 
and Loynes 2016, 1). This is perhaps most evident in its revolving door of proposed and short-
lived carbon pricing policies over the past decade.42 In the absence of a consistent economy-wide 
carbon price, the main climate policy in Australia that has the potential to increase costs for EITE 
industries is the renewable energy target (RET). The RET was first introduced in 2001 and sets 
yearly targets for renewable electricity generation. Responsibility for meeting the targets falls 
largely on electricity retailers, which are legally required to ensure that a certain percentage of 
the electricity they acquire and sell each year is from renewable energy sources (Clean Energy 
Regulator 2018). 
EITE Definition
Although Australia has yet to implement a consistent carbon price, it has been consistently aware 
of the potential impact of its climate policies on EITE industries. It first established a definition 
for EITE activities (production processes) when developing the legislation for a proposed cap-
and-trade program in 2008. This same definition is currently used to support EITE activities from 
potential cost increases as a result of the RET. It is notable that Australia’s reference to EITE 
activities is both unique and deliberate. Specifically, it does not want the policy to influence the 
physical or corporate structure of a company by providing EITE support at the industry level. As a 
result, within an industry, support is targeted to specific processes identified as EITE.43
The equations Australia uses to determine emissions intensity and trade exposure are:
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 =
𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 (𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2𝐼𝐼)
𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 ($𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸)
 
𝑇𝑇𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼 =
𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸 + 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸
𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
 
Australia’s emissions-intensity calculation differs from other jurisdictions on two grounds. First, its 
measure of indirect emissions is the broadest, including emissions associated with the production of 
electricity, steam and natural gas used as inputs by the production activity or process. Second, it is 
the only jurisdiction to use revenue as the default income measure. This was a controversial choice 
among numerous industries that felt the revenue measure failed to capture the fact that many high-
revenue activities also have high input costs (Australian Government 2008, 32). In response 
42 
Australia’s first legislative attempt to introduce a carbon price was the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) in 2008. 
Following three attempts to pass the CPRS legislation into law it was ultimately abandoned in 2010. In 2011 the Government 
of Australia successfully passed the Clean Energy Act. The Clean Energy Act introduced a three-year carbon tax in 
Australia, effective July 1, 2012, which was intended to precede the introduction of a cap-and-trade program. Only two 
years after it was introduced, however, the act was repealed. The current government remains opposed to an economy-wide 
carbon price of any kind (Hutchens 2016). Instead, it recently announced its National Energy Guarantee, a policy that will 
require energy retailers and large energy users to meet specific reliability and emissions-reduction obligations.
43 From the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (the cap-and-trade program proposed in 2008) white paper, the motivation 
for using an activity-level approach is: “... an activity-level approach will allow the Government to target assistance most 
effectively and equitably. Provision of assistance to an entire company or facility, in contrast, may provide a relative benefit 
to some entities based purely on their physical or corporate structure. Targeting assistance to a specific activity will ensure 
that the provision of EITE assistance does not provide incentives to alter a company or facility structure to maximize the 
receipt of assistance.” (Commonwealth of Australia 2008, 19). 
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to this concern, the Government of Australia provided the option for certain activities to request 
assessment based on GVA instead.44 
Australia’s trade exposure calculation is also unique in that it is the only jurisdiction that does 
not include imports in both the numerator and the denominator of the equation. Accordingly, for 
any given values of imports, exports and production, Australia’s equation will result in a higher 
estimate of trade exposure relative to other jurisdictions. Similar to the EU, Australia also does 
not rely strictly on the trade exposure equation for determining EITE status. Rather, if trade data 
for an activity are lacking, or if the calculation falls just below the trade-exposure threshold for 
EITE classification, then the activity is eligible for a qualitative assessment. It will subsequently be 
classified as trade-exposed if the assessment demonstrates that producers are constrained in their 
ability to pass on carbon costs to customers due to the potential for international competition. 
Australia has two EITE categories — moderate and high — which depend primarily on an 
activity’s emissions intensity (Figure 4). When the EITE categories were first introduced they 
were intended to impact the number of free allocations for which a facility would be eligible under 
Australia’s proposed cap-and-trade program. Support provided to EITE activities for the RET, 
however, is independent of an activity’s EITE categorization. 
FIGURE 4 AUSTRALIA EITE CRITERIA
E
m
is
si
on
s I
nt
en
si
ty
 
(t
 o
f C
O
2e
/$
M
 o
f R
ev
en
ue
 o
r 
G
V
A
) > 2,000 
(Revenue-based) 
> 6,000 
(GVA-based) 
 
High 
1,000 — 1,999 
(Revenue-based) 
3,000 — 5,999 
(GVA-based) 
Moderate 
< 999 
(Revenue-based) 
< 2,999 
(GVA-based) 
 
 
< 10% > 10% 
Trade Exposure 
 Source: Australian Government (2008)
RET Exemption Certificates
A facility’s use of electricity in an EITE activity is eligible to receive an exemption certificate from 
the RET. Historically, the amounts of the exemption certificates were calculated using a product 
calculation method, in which a facility’s output was multiplied by a product-specific electricity-
intensity benchmark. In most cases this would result in an exemption certificate that was greater or 
less than the facility’s actual electricity use. To better align the exemption certificate amount with a 
44 The Australian Government resisted changing the income measurement for all activities to GVA due to a lack of readily 
available data. Specifically, the CPRS white paper notes that estimates of GVA are available from the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics for industries and sub-industries but that these data rarely correspond to activities that are eligible for EITE 
classification (Australian Government 2008, 33). 
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facility’s actual electricity use, the Government of Australia introduced the electricity use method 
starting in 2018. Under the electricity use method, facilities are issued an exemption certificate 
for the measured amount of electricity used in their EITE activities. With the introduction of the 
electricity use method the product calculation method is being phased out and will no longer be 
used starting in 2020.
SUMMARY OF EITE DEFINITIONS AND SUPPORT POLICIES
Jurisdiction Emissions-Intensity 
(EI) Calculation
Trade-Exposure 
(TE) Calculation
EITE Definition Free Allocation
Canada Forecast actual 
carbon pricing costs 
as share of gross 
value added.
Carbon emissions 
covered by the price 
are multiplied by 0.3 
to account for the 
initial anticipated 
level of carbon 
pricing support. 
Trade (exports and 
imports) as share of 
domestic production 
and imports.
EITE status is being assessed through a 
three-phase process: (1) A static analysis 
of EI and TE; (2) A dynamic analysis of EI 
and TE and (3) A supplementary analysis 
of other potential competitiveness 
impacts. 
Sectors qualifying as high EITE 
according to Alberta’s criteria (provided 
below) in either the static or dynamic 
analysis, or which are found to have 
significant potential competitiveness 
impacts, are eligible to receive a higher 
level of carbon pricing support.
All facilities participating in the OBPS are eligible for 
free allocations.
Allocation for each product produced by a facility. 
Allocation takes the form of an emissions limit.
Allocation determined using a facility’s annual 
production and a sector-level emissions-intensity 
benchmark for each product.
Proposed starting benchmark is 80% of the historical 
national production-weighted average emissions 
intensity of each product for 13 of 17 sectors. Four 
sectors assessed as “high risk” in Phases 1 and 2 have a 
benchmark of 90% of the historical national production-
weighted average emissions intensity of each product. 
Starting benchmarks may be adjusted further based 
on the outcome of the Phase 3 competitiveness 
assessment. Additional benchmarks are under 
development and will likely be released in fall 2018.
British 
Columbia
N/A N/A Qualitative assessment based on:
(1) Large proportion of priced GHGs 
which industry is unable to mitigate in a 
cost-effective manner; and 
(2) Exposure to a competitive import 
and export market.
N/A
Alberta “Full” carbon pricing 
costs (if all direct 
emissions from a 
facility were priced) 
as share of gross 
value added.
Trade (exports and 
imports) as share of 
domestic production 
and imports.
Three levels of leakage risk but only 
facilities designated as high qualify as 
EITE.
High: EI greater than 30%, or EI between 
15-30% and TE between 10-20%, or EI 
between 3-15% and TE above 20%.
Any facility with emissions in excess of 100,000 tonnes 
of CO2e per year (or competing with such a facility) is 
eligible for free allocations regardless of EITE status. 
Facility with emissions between 50,000 and 100,000 
tonnes of CO2e per year is eligible for free allocations 
only if it is EITE. 
Allocation for each product produced by a facility, less 
energy inputs used in production. Allocation takes the 
form of an emissions limit. Allocation determined using 
facility’s annual production and a sector- or facility-level 
emissions-intensity benchmark for each product. 
Standard benchmark is 80% of the historical production-
weighted average emissions intensity of the product 
or “best in class.” Benchmark for EITE industries may 
be adjusted upwards to 90% or 100% of the historical 
average. 
Benchmark includes emissions associated with energy 
inputs used in production.
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Jurisdiction Emissions-Intensity 
(EI) Calculation
Trade-Exposure 
(TE) Calculation
EITE Definition Free Allocation
Ontario N/A N/A No formal definition. 
Policy documents use California’s EITE 
definition for analysis purposes.
Nearly all participants in the cap-and-trade market 
were eligible for free allocations (key exceptions were 
electricity generators and natural gas distributors).
All facilities assigned a base allocation, which may be 
independent of production. Allocation was distributed 
as emissions permits.
Six different definitions of the base allocation; most 
common was a facility’s production multiplied by a 
sector- or facility-level intensity benchmark. 
The base allocation is adjusted by an assistance factor 
(between 0 and 1) and a cap adjustment factor. The 
assistance factor (through to 2020) was one. 
The cap adjustment factor was one in 2018. Starting 
in 2019 it was set to decline annually according to the 
overall cap on Ontario’s emissions.
Québec N/A N/A No formal definition. Nearly all participants in the cap-and-trade market are 
eligible for free allocations (key exceptions are natural 
gas distributors and some electricity generators).
Allocation for each product produced by a facility. 
Allocation is distributed as emissions permits. Allocation 
determined using a facility’s annual production and 
either a sector-level or a facility-level emissions 
benchmark for each product. 
Facility-level benchmark: determined by historical 
facility-level emissions for each product. Sector-level 
benchmark: benchmark for a facility is the larger of 
its own emissions intensity benchmark (calculated 
according to the facility-level method) in a given year or 
a target sector-level intensity in 2020.
Benchmark is approximately 80% of the historical 
emissions intensity of each product. Benchmark declines 
annually to a 2020 target intensity.
California Emissions (tonnes) 
per million dollars 
($USD) of gross 
value added.
Trade (imports and 
exports) as share of 
domestic production 
and imports.
Three levels of leakage risk. Support 
policies have been largely independent 
of leakage risk.
High: EI greater than 5,000, or EI 
between 1,000-4,999 and TE greater 
than 19%.
Medium: EI between 1,000-4,999 and TE 
less than or equal to 19%, or EI between 
100-999 and TE greater than 10%.
Low: EI less than 1,000 and TE less than 
10%, or EI < 100.
Nearly all participants in the cap-and-trade market 
are eligible for free allocations (key exceptions are 
electricity generators and natural gas pipelines).
Allocation for each product produced by a facility. 
Allocation is distributed as emissions permits.
Allocation determined using a facility’s annual 
production and a sector-level emissions-intensity 
benchmark for each product, modified by an assistance 
factor (between 0 and 1) and a cap adjustment factor.
Current assistance factor is one for high leakage risk, 
0.75 for medium and 0.5 for low. Reverts to one for all 
industries in 2021 (current lower values may also be 
retroactively reversed).
The cap adjustment factor declines annually according 
to the overall cap on California’s emissions.
Standard benchmark is 90% of the historical state-wide 
production-weighted average emissions intensity of the 
product or “best in class.”
30
Jurisdiction Emissions-Intensity 
(EI) Calculation
Trade-Exposure 
(TE) Calculation
EITE Definition Free Allocation
European 
Union
Until 2021
Direct and indirect 
carbon pricing costs 
as a share of gross 
value added.
Direct costs are 
priced emissions 
multiplied by 
emissions price.
Indirect costs are 
estimated emissions 
costs associated 
with electricity use.
2021 and Later
Emissions (kg) per 
euro (€) of gross 
value added.
Trade (imports and 
exports) as share of 
domestic production 
and imports.
Yes/no categorization. 
Until 2021
Yes: EI greater than 30%, or TE greater 
than 30%, or EI between 5-30% and TE 
between 10-29%.
Sectors can be added to the carbon 
leakage list based on a qualitative 
assessment. 
2021 and later.
Yes: EI multiplied by TE greater than 
or equal to 0.2. Sectors can be added 
to the carbon leakage list based on a 
qualitative assessment.
Nearly all participants in the cap-and-trade market 
are eligible for free allocations (key exception is most 
electricity generators).
Allocation for each product produced by a facility. 
Allocation is distributed as emissions permits.
Allocation determined using a facility’s historical 
production and an industry-level emissions-intensity 
benchmark for each product, modified by an assistance 
factor (between zero and one) and a cap adjustment 
factor.
Sector benchmark is equal to the historical unweighted 
average emissions intensity of the 10% of facilities with 
the lowest emissions intensity.
The assistance factor is one for facilities on the leakage 
risk list. For facilities not on the list, the assistance factor 
declines from 0.8 in 2013 to zero in 2030.
The cap adjustment factor is set annually and is equal 
to the emissions cap divided by the total number of 
requested free allocations.
Australia Direct and indirect 
emissions (tonnes) 
per million dollars 
($AUS) of revenue.
Alternative 
definition: Direct 
and indirect 
emissions (tonnes) 
per million dollars of 
gross value added.
Trade (imports 
and exports) as a 
share of domestic 
production.
Two categories: High and Moderate.
High: TE greater than 10% and EI greater 
than 2,000 (if revenue-based) or greater 
than 6,000 (if GVA-based).
Moderate: TE greater than 10% and EI 
between 1,000-1,999 (if revenue-based) 
or between 3,000-5,999 (if GVA-based).
No free allocations.
Use of electricity in an EITE activity is eligible for 
exemption certificates for the measured amount of 
electricity used in facilities’ EITE activities. This exempts 
electricity distributors from sourcing more expensive 
renewable electricity for these facilities.
ASSESSMENT OF EITE SUPPORT POLICIES
In this section we assess the EITE support policies described above on the basis of four criteria: 
administrative costs, effectiveness of ameliorating leakage, economic efficiency and equity across 
facilities and sectors. Our goal is to provide an overview of the extent to which EITE policies 
are effective in minimizing the negative competitiveness impacts of carbon pricing while still 
supporting the goal of achieving a global reduction in greenhouse gas emissions.45 We focus our 
discussion on a subset of the jurisdictions discussed above — specifically Alberta, Ontario,46 
Québec, California and the European Union — as these are the jurisdictions that have implemented 
some form of carbon pricing and which have fully developed support policies for industrial 
facilities. We organize this section by assessment criteria to facilitate an easier comparison of each 
across jurisdictions. 
45 We note that it is possible to design an EITE policy to fully offset the costs of emissions pricing, but this would undermine 
the principle behind the price instrument, and it would be simpler to exempt large emitters if the objective is to provide full 
protection.
46 Though Ontario — as of July 2018 — is in the process of dismantling its cap-and-trade system, we refer to it in the present 
tense in this section for ease of exposition.
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Administrative Costs
Administrative costs refer to the costs incurred by government in implementing the EITE support 
policy, and firms in ensuring eligibility to receive it.47 As outlined in detail in the previous section, 
Alberta, Ontario, Québec, California and the EU all use free allocations to support EITE industries. 
Administrative costs of free allocations are largely weighted towards the government. Upfront 
costs include the initial EITE assessment and defining the government-set parameters of the free 
allocation equation. Alberta, California and the EU are the three jurisdictions with formal EITE 
definitions, with administrative costs of the assessment likely being slightly higher in the EU as 
it uses both quantitative and qualitative criteria in defining its carbon leakage list. In comparison, 
Ontario and Québec have opted not to define specific EITE criteria at this time.
There are three potential parameters in the free allocation formulas that are set by government: the 
assistance factor, the cap adjustment factor and the emissions-intensity benchmark. The assistance 
factor and the cap adjustment factor are only used in Ontario, California and the EU while 
emissions-intensity benchmarks are used in all five jurisdictions. 
Setting the emissions-intensity benchmarks incurs the highest administrative costs due to the data 
requirements and the large number of products and facilities for which benchmarks are defined. 
Administrative costs will increase with the number of benchmarks being defined. Importantly, 
however, a trade-off is required — up to a certain point — to ensure benchmarks are defined 
broadly enough to provide an emissions-reduction incentive and specifically enough not to distort a 
facility’s production decision.48 
Québec, California and the EU simplify the process of defining emissions-intensity benchmarks 
and reduce their administrative costs by using a largely standard methodology. California and 
the EU additionally reduce costs by defining benchmarks at the sector level whereas in Québec 
benchmarks are largely facility-specific. Alberta and Ontario use a combination of facility- and 
sector-specific benchmarks. Alberta has a standard methodology for defining benchmarks but also 
frequently deviates to alternative approaches, likely raising its administrative costs. Ontario does 
not describe the derivation of its sector-specific benchmarks, and for facility-level benchmarks it 
uses a combination of emissions-intensity and historical-based benchmarks over varying years. 
Similar to Alberta, the lack of a consistent approach likely raises its administrative costs.
The most significant ongoing administrative cost to government from the EITE support policies is 
the annual calculation of free allocations. This cost is incurred in every jurisdiction except Alberta, 
where facilities are required to calculate and report the number of free allocations for which they 
are eligible in their compliance reports each year. The administrative cost is likely comparatively 
lower in the EU, where free allocations are based on historical production and distributed only once 
per year. In contrast, in California, Ontario and Québec free allocations for each year are originally 
distributed based on an estimate of production and subsequently updated once actual production 
data are available. 
47 Our focus in this discussion is primarily on the administrative costs of the EITE support policies, and except in areas of 
overlap, we do not discuss governments’ costs of implementing the underlying emissions pricing plan or facilities’ costs of 
complying with it.
48 
The danger if benchmarks are defined too specifically — that is, at the facility level — is that a facility will have a reduced 
incentive to achieve a best-in-class emissions intensity for its output. Alternatively, however, if benchmarks are defined 
too broadly — that is, at a high-level sector classification such as food product manufacturing — then a facility may have 
an incentive to change its product mix. Most jurisdictions adequately address this concern by defining benchmarks that 
are specific to a particular product within a sector. That is, as discussed in the jurisdictional review section of the main 
text, sector-level benchmarks are typically defined at the NAICS six-digit level and below. For example, California has five 
different emissions-intensity benchmarks within the snack food manufacturing sector (California Air Resources Board 
2017b, 174). 
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In Québec, California and the EU, the government calculates and distributes free allocations based 
on a facility’s report of its annual verified emissions, which is required under separate regulation. 
As a result, for mandatory cap-and-trade program participants in these jurisdictions the free 
allocations impose no additional administrative costs on the facility. Ontario, in contrast, imposes 
a small administrative cost by requiring facilities to submit an application for free allocations each 
year. Facility administrative costs are highest in Alberta where facilities must submit at least one 
— and for large emitters, five — reports per year. Additionally, facilities must complete and submit 
a request form to receive any surplus emissions credits for which they are eligible.
In Alberta, Ontario, Québec and California, voluntary participants in the carbon pricing programs 
have higher administrative costs by virtue of the opt-in paperwork requirements. Opt-in facilities 
in these jurisdictions must additionally incur costs to have their reported emissions verified each 
year, a requirement that doesn’t exist for facilities that are covered by the respective reporting 
regulations, but which do not participate in the carbon pricing programs. The EU does not appear 
to have a voluntary participation option at the facility level. Rather, decisions to extend the scope of 
the EU ETS are made at the country level.
Allowing voluntary participants in carbon pricing programs to receive EITE support helps to 
protect smaller producers from the negative competitive impacts of carbon pricing (discussed 
further in the equity section) and further guards against carbon leakage. The trade-off, however, 
is an increase in government administrative costs as a larger number of free allocations must 
be processed each year. It may also be necessary to establish additional emissions-intensity 
benchmarks. The EU ETS minimizes these costs by not allowing facilities to opt in on their 
own accord. Countries therefore maintain control over the scope of the ETS and hopefully will 
only extend the scope if they determine the reduced carbon leakage benefit offsets the additional 
administrative costs.
California has minimal mechanisms in place to ensure that the higher administrative costs 
associated with opt-in participants are offset by reduced carbon leakage. Rather, facilities of any 
size that operate in broadly defined industries covered by the cap-and-trade program are eligible to 
opt in. Ontario and Québec take a similar approach, although both provinces establish a minimum 
threshold of 10,000 tonnes of CO2e annually to be eligible to opt in. Last, Alberta arguably strikes 
the best balance by limiting voluntary participation to facilities in EITE industries with minimum 
annual emissions of 50,000 tonnes of CO2e, or to facilities of any size that produce the same 
product (typically defined at the seven-digit level of the North American Product Classification 
System) as a facility that has a mandatory participation requirement under the CCIR.
Effectiveness in Ameliorating Leakage
As noted above in the section Rationale and Theory of EITE Support Policies, historical-based 
free allocations do not impact a facility’s decision on how much to produce. This is because the 
allocation a facility receives is independent of a facility’s current production decision. In contrast, 
with output-based free allocations (OBAs), the allocation a facility receives is directly determined 
by its current production decision. By effectively providing a subsidy to output, OBAs therefore 
provide a stronger incentive to increase output than historical-based free allocations (Fowlie 2012). 
This suggests that OBAs — the system used by Alberta, California, Québec and Ontario — should 
be more effective at minimizing carbon leakage than historical-based free allocations — the 
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system currently used in the EU. This is largely supported in the modelling literature that directly 
compares estimates of emissions leakage under the two allocation methods.49 
Examining the European cement industry, Demailly and Quirion (2006) find that historical-based 
allocations will result in carbon leakage of approximately 50 per cent while OBAs set at 90 per 
cent of a facility’s historical emissions intensity will result in a leakage rate of just under 10 per 
cent. As the benchmark for the OBA decreases — that is, falls below 90 per cent — the leakage 
rate associated with OBAs moves closer to that of grandfathering. Extending the analysis to a 
larger number of sectors, Demailly and Quirion (2008) similarly find that allocating emissions by 
OBA will result in less leakage than an allocation via historical-based allocations and auctioning. 
Further, the advantage of OBAs over historical allocations generally increases the more stringent 
the emissions-reduction target.50 
Meunier, Ponssard and Quirion (2014) present a contrasting result for the EU cement sector, finding 
the historical-based allocation is approximately equal to or superior to OBAs at preventing carbon 
leakage (although in the latter case, the OBAs result in higher domestic emissions reductions). 
However, they note the set-up of their model — a partial equilibrium analysis that does not 
account for the EU’s economy-wide emissions cap — contributes to the leakage rate being a poor 
comparator between the different scenarios.
Studies comparing free allocation mechanisms in the U.S. similarly find that OBAs are more 
effective than historical allocations at limiting carbon leakage. Fischer and Fox (2007) find a carbon 
leakage rate of just over 14 per cent with historical allocations and just under 12 per cent with 
OBAs that are allocated according to historical sector-level emissions and current output shares.51 
In a working paper that looks specifically at EITE industries, Fischer and Fox (2010) find that OBAs 
allocated based on current production reduce the leakage rate relative to historical allocations by 
greater than half, falling from 28 per cent to approximately 12 per cent. Last, in an analysis specific 
to the U.S. cement industry, Fowlie, Reguant and Ryan (2016) similarly find that estimates of total 
carbon leakage tend to be over 50 per cent lower when using OBAs versus historical allocations. 
The differential between leakage rates is also found to increase as the carbon price increases.
Consistent with the theory, the modelling literature strongly suggests OBAs, a lower carbon price 
and higher benchmarks will all contribute to reducing carbon leakage. Under these criteria, among 
the jurisdictions that use OBAs, California and Québec seem likely to have the lowest rates of 
carbon leakage. As they participate in a joint carbon market they have the same carbon price, which 
in the most recent auctions has hovered around $19 per tonne. Potential leakage in California is 
reduced by the state having the highest standard benchmark — 90 per cent of historical sector-level 
emissions — while in Québec it is likely reduced by extensive use of facility-level benchmarks. 
While Ontario also shared the same carbon price as California and Québec, it is more difficult 
to assess potential leakage due to the lack of information over how sector-level benchmarks are 
defined. Further, when facility-level allocations are used they favour both higher and lower leakage 
rates. Specifically, facility-level OBAs are based on 100 per cent of a facility’s historical emissions 
49 As noted above in footnote 4, another mechanism that can be used to reduce carbon leakage is border tax adjustments 
(BTAs). Studies comparing EITE support policies generally find that a BTA is more effective at reducing carbon leakage 
than historical or output-based allocations to domestic producers (Demailly and Quirion 2008, Meunier, Ponssard, and 
Quirion 2014, Fowlie, Reguant, and Ryan 2016, Fischer and Fox 2012).
50 Interestingly, in contrast to their 2006 result, the exception to this is the cement sector. This differing result is attributed  
to limitations of the 2008 model, which assumes the cement sector has restricted options for reducing its emissions  
(Quirion 2009). 
51 
Specifically, Fischer and Fox (2007) consider a cap-and-trade program in which the entire cap is distributed as OBAs. The 
cap for each sector is determined by a sector’s share of total historical emissions while the allocation to each facility is 
based on its current share of output in the sector.
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intensity, suggesting lower leakage. In contrast, however, higher leakage is likely to result among 
facilities that receive absolute allocations based only on their historical emissions. 
Alberta is likely susceptible to slightly higher rates of carbon leakage, simply because its carbon 
price of $30 per tonne is 50 per cent higher than the current prevailing price in Québec and 
California. Alberta’s standard emissions-intensity benchmark, at both the sector- and facility-level, 
is also slightly lower at 80 per cent of historical emissions intensities. Notably, however, EITE 
industries are eligible for higher rates of 90 and 100 per cent. 
As noted earlier, the EU’s system of historical-based allocations is most susceptible to higher rates 
of carbon leakage. It is worth noting, however, that the EU permit price has been depressed for 
much of the time since the current system of free allocations was first introduced (in 2013) and 
has only started to reach prices comparable to other jurisdictions in the second quarter of 2018. As 
these lower prices will have limited the negative cost impact on facilities from participation in the 
EU ETS, it will also have helped reduce carbon leakage in recent years.
Last, the treatment of indirect emissions may also play a role in determining carbon leakage. In 
particular, EITE industries may face negative competitiveness impacts if increased carbon costs 
related to electricity generation emissions are not compensated in some form. Unsurprisingly, the 
risk for increased carbon leakage is highest in industries that are electricity-intensive and trade-
exposed. Demailly and Quirion (2008), for example, show that in the European aluminum sector, 
extending OBAs to the electricity sector reduces leakage by approximately 10 to 25 per cent. In 
contrast, leakage in the cement sector, which has a low electricity intensity and a relatively low 
trade exposure, is virtually unchanged. 
This result suggests compensation for indirect emissions can reduce carbon leakage but support 
should be targeted towards industries that are most at risk. Fischer and Fox (2010) enforce this 
intuition. Comparing a scenario where EITE facilities receive OBAs for indirect emissions versus 
one in which the entire electricity sector receives OBAs, they find virtually no change in carbon 
leakage rates for either the cumulative EITE sectors or the economy as a whole. That is, their results 
suggest that extending carbon pricing support to the entire electricity sector will not reduce carbon 
leakage any further than if support for increased electricity prices is only provided to EITE sectors. 
The European Union arguably comes closest to targeting support for indirect emissions only to 
industries at risk of increased carbon leakage from increased electricity costs. It lacks, however, 
a formal mechanism for doing so. Rather, as noted earlier, it generally does not provide any 
free allocations to the electricity industry and financial support for industries facing increased 
electricity costs is left as a country-level decision.
In Alberta and California, in contrast, support for indirect emissions appears to go beyond what 
is required to minimize carbon leakage from EITE industries. Specifically, in Alberta electricity 
generators are eligible to receive direct free allocations, while in California electricity distributors 
receive free allocations with the requirement that they be used to offset price increases to all 
consumers. Both jurisdictions therefore have a formal mechanism to offset increased electricity 
costs from carbon pricing but they do so without regard to whether the increased costs are likely to 
result in increased carbon leakage.
Last, Ontario and Québec fall on the opposite side of the spectrum from Alberta and California, 
with both provinces providing only limited support for indirect emissions under specific conditions. 
Both jurisdictions, however, rely primarily on non-carbon emitting sources of electricity 
generation. As a result, electricity cost increases from the introduction of carbon pricing are likely 
to be minimal.
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Economic Efficiency
Policies that support EITE industries by combating carbon leakage can be welfare-improving for a 
jurisdiction when they redirect consumer spending that might otherwise be spent on international 
goods toward domestic producers. This causes domestic producer surplus to increase relative to 
a scenario in which there are no support policies in place. Importantly, however, this welfare gain 
from increased domestic sales is only achieved when the danger of carbon leakage exists.
From an economic efficiency perspective, the appropriate targeting of free allocations to industries 
at risk of carbon leakage is therefore important. This is because there are definitive costs of EITE 
support policies that accompany this potential welfare gain.
The most significant of these costs is forgone government revenues. Specifically, the opportunity 
cost to government of EITE support policies is the total number of free allocations distributed in 
a year multiplied by the carbon price. For example, in Québec in 2016, the government distributed 
just under 18,500,000 emissions permits free of charge. The settlement price in the 2016 permit 
auctions hovered around $17 per tonne, representing a revenue cost to the Québec government of 
over $300 million. 
It is not surprising, then, that in an analysis that compares economic outcomes in a cap-and-trade 
system with economy-wide free allocations, versus one in which all emissions permits are sold 
and the revenues are used to reduce labour taxes, Fischer and Fox (2007, 594) find that only the 
latter scenario results in a welfare improvement, as well as positive changes in employment and 
the real wage. In contrast, however, analyses that look at free allocations targeted specifically to 
EITE industries regularly find that by reducing carbon leakage, the free allocations result in higher 
welfare relative to a scenario in which all emissions permits are sold (Fischer and Fox 2010, Fowlie, 
Reguant, and Ryan 2016). Notably, welfare tends to be highest when the allocations are output-
based as opposed to historical.
While OBAs are generally preferred from an efficiency perspective to historical-based allocations, 
it is even more important that they are targeted appropriately as they incent an increase in domestic 
output which is accompanied by one of two costs. First, if the OBAs are implemented alongside 
emissions-intensity standards or a carbon price, then the higher level of domestic output will result 
in higher emissions than what is optimal. Conversely, if the OBAs are implemented alongside a 
cap-and-trade program, then there is no room for domestic emissions to increase. Rather, in order 
to allow for higher production while remaining under the emissions cap, the emissions intensity of 
production will be lower than what is optimal. Further, as marginal abatement costs are decreasing 
in emissions intensity — that is, the lower a facility’s emissions intensity the higher cost it will be 
to achieve additional reductions — this implies that marginal abatement costs, and correspondingly 
the carbon price, are higher than is optimal.
The targeting of free allocations to industries at risk of carbon leakage is an area in which all 
jurisdictions currently fall short. This is most obvious in Ontario and Québec, which do not have 
an EITE definition and instead provide free allocations to nearly all industrial facilities without 
any formal assessment of their emissions intensiveness or trade exposure. Alberta has a formal 
definition, but among mandatory participants in the province’s pricing program, it at best makes 
only a small difference to the number of free allocations — and thereby the value of the output 
subsidy — for which a facility is eligible. California similarly has a formal EITE definition but only 
recently started to provide differentiated support to facilities based on carbon leakage risk. At best, 
however, this is only a temporary change. Starting in 2021 all facilities will receive the same level 
of support, regardless of EITE status. At worst, the CARB may proceed with a proposal that will 
retroactively reverse the current policy of differentiated support. 
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Last, the EU has a formal definition for industries at risk of carbon leakage, and the free allocation 
to a facility in an industry not on the carbon leakage list is significantly smaller than the allocation 
to a facility in an industry on the carbon leakage list. The EITE definition, however, is currently 
very broad. Looking only at the emissions from industrial facilities eligible for free allocations, 97 
per cent of emissions are from industries on the carbon leakage list (European Commission 2015a). 
How the emissions-intensity benchmarks for the free allocations are defined can also have 
important efficiency implications. Free allocations are effectively a subsidy to firms, with the 
monetary value of each individual allocation equal to the carbon price. This in turn implies that 
when free allocations are distributed according to facility-level emissions-intensity benchmarks, 
facilities producing the same product will receive a different monetary subsidy per unit of output, 
lowering the policy’s efficiency. Further, the largest absolute subsidies per unit of output will go to 
facilities with the highest historical emissions intensities. In contrast, with sector-level emissions-
intensity benchmarks, all facilities producing the same product will receive the same subsidy per 
unit of output. As sector-level benchmarks provide a stronger incentive to facilities to improve their 
emissions intensities, they are more consistent with the goals of carbon pricing.
Under these criteria the free allocations in California and the EU are most efficient, as they are 
assigned exclusively according to sector-level benchmarks. Alberta similarly tends to use sector-
level benchmarks for any industry with at least two or more facilities operating in the province. 
However, there are a small number of sectors for which Alberta makes exceptions and assigns 
facility-level benchmarks instead. Ontario appears to follow a similar approach to Alberta, 
although it is less explicit in explaining when and why facility-level benchmarks are used. Last, 
Québec’s emissions-intensity benchmarks nearly all start at the facility level, with only a subset 
converging to sector-level benchmarks in 2020. 
Other factors that impact the relative efficiencies of historical-based free allocations and OBAs 
include the presence of labour taxes, the elasticity of the labour supply, the level of competition 
(perfect or imperfect) within a market, the coverage of the carbon price, uncertainty around future 
demand, and in the case of a cap-and-trade program, the stringency of the emissions reduction 
target (Bernard, Fischer, and Fox 2007; Fischer 2011; Fischer and Fox 2007; Meunier, Ponssard, 
and Quirion 2014). When these additional factors are added to a model with carbon leakage, it is 
no longer the case that OBAs will be immediately preferred. Rather, the relative efficiencies of 
historical-based free allocations and OBAs will depend on how these different factors interact 
together in a general equilibrium setting. As research exploring these complexities is ongoing, 
governments should remain flexible and regularly review and adjust policies as needed.
Last, it is worth noting the above discussion focuses largely on the static relationship between free 
allocations and economic efficiency. In all jurisdictions, however, it is also important to recognize 
that how the subsidy changes over time may also impact a facility’s current decision on emissions-
intensity improvements. Specifically, if a higher reduction in a facility’s emissions intensity results 
in a higher tightening rate — which thereby reduces the free allocations for which a facility is 
eligible — then this can negate the incentive for a facility to invest in achieving this reduction.
The only jurisdiction that is currently exposed to this risk is the EU, which starting in 2021 will tie 
the tightening rates on emissions-intensity benchmarks to observed sector-level emissions-intensity 
improvements. As the EU benchmarks are based only on the emissions intensities of the top 10 per 
cent of facilities in a sector, however, the negative incentive will not directly extend to all facilities 
in a sector. The EU is also softening the negative incentive on the top-performing facilities by 
imposing both a minimum and maximum level on the potential range of tightening rates.
In contrast to the EU, Alberta, Ontario and California employ what is arguably the best practice of 
using tightening rates that are defined exogenously and are in no way related to facility- or sector-
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level emissions intensities. As a result, there is no incentive for facilities to hold back on emissions-
intensity improvements in order to preserve current subsidy levels. In Québec, current tightening 
rates are based on historical emissions intensities from prior to the cap-and-trade program being 
introduced. While technically this satisfies the criterion of being independent of current emissions 
intensities, Québec has only defined tightening rates through to 2020, and the current method 
sets the precedent for future tightening rates to be based on current emissions. This precedent 
may in turn influence a facility’s current decision around its investments in emissions-intensity 
improvements. It is arguably preferable, therefore, for tightening rates to be completely divorced 
from emissions from the outset of a carbon pricing program.
Equity Across and Within Sectors
The equity of EITE policies is closely related to the efficiency of the policies. In considering equity, 
what is most common is a desire for equal treatment of facilities within and across sectors. 
Assigning free allocations via historical or current production has implications for equity. 
Specifically, historical-based free allocations are more likely to provide windfall profits to facilities. 
This is particularly relevant in a scenario where a facility decreases its production relative to the 
historical baseline used to calculate its allocation. In this scenario the facility effectively continues 
to be compensated for emissions that it no longer produces. Historical allocations also have a 
distributional implication for firms that enter after allocations have been assigned — they may not 
receive any allocation and are therefore disadvantaged relative to incumbents (notably, this is not 
the case in the EU which established a new entrants reserve that provides allocations to new firms).
In contrast, OBAs can result in a windfall to low emissions-intensity facilities, relative to facilities 
with higher emissions intensities which suffer most of the cost impacts of increasingly stringent 
environmental policy (Bushnell and Chen 2012). As the value of a facility’s subsidy is tethered 
to its current production, OBAs reward production and penalize emissions through the emissions 
price. However, while a negative from the perspective of facilities with high emissions intensities, 
“rewarding” lower-emitting firms through this windfall is not an objectively bad outcome when one 
recalls the overall purpose of emissions pricing and complementary EITE policies. An additional 
benefit of OBAs is that if a facility adjusts its output — up or down — then the total value of the 
OBA it receives will move in the same direction. Further, new facilities are similarly eligible to 
receive the same OBA as an existing facility as it is calculated based on current period production. 
Along the metric of equity in allocation of free permits, the EITE support policies in Alberta, 
Ontario, Québec and California are therefore more equitable than in the EU. 
Independent of how the allocations are distributed, how the benchmarks are defined is also an 
important equity consideration, particularly within a sector. Of particular note is whether the 
benchmarks are defined at the facility or sector level. As noted earlier, in the former case, facilities 
producing the same product will receive a different monetary subsidy per unit of output. Further, the 
largest absolute subsidies per unit of output will go to facilities with the highest historical emissions 
intensities. In contrast, with sector-level emissions-intensity benchmarks, all facilities producing the 
same product will receive the same subsidy per unit of output. On this basis, the free allocations in 
California, the EU and Alberta are most equitable as they are mainly assigned according to sector-
level benchmarks.
It is worth noting, however, that “softening the blow” is often a political consideration, particularly 
in generating buy-in for the emissions pricing system itself. Facility-level benchmarks that provide 
greater compensation to more emissions-intensive facilities may therefore be desirable for that reason.
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A third distributional consideration is whether all facilities competing in an EITE industry are 
eligible for carbon pricing support, regardless of size. The EU ETS cap-and-trade program only 
covers industrial facilities and it additionally has the broadest direct participation requirements, often 
requiring mandatory participation in the cap-and-trade program by all facilities in a sector, regardless 
of size. Accordingly, this also means that free allocations are often extended to all facilities in a 
sector, once again regardless of size. In industries where minimum thresholds exist, however, smaller 
facilities may face a cost disadvantage from increased electricity prices, particularly as the majority 
of fossil-fuel electricity generators in the ETS are not eligible for free allocations. 
The carbon pricing systems in Alberta, Ontario, Québec and California cover both industrial 
facilities and fossil fuel distributors. As a result, small industrial facilities that are not required to 
participate in the pricing system may still face increased costs for purchased electricity, heat and 
fossil fuels.
The mandatory participation threshold for the cap-and-trade programs in Ontario, Québec and 
California is 25,000 tonnes of CO2e emissions per year. In California, however, any facility with 
emissions below this level, and which competes in an industry that is eligible for mandatory 
participation, may opt in to the cap-and-trade program and is then eligible to receive free 
allocations. Additionally, as noted earlier, California provides free allocations to electricity 
distributors, and requires these allocations be used to offset electricity price increases. This further 
ensures that all industrial facilities — regardless of size — are protected from electricity cost 
increases attributable to carbon pricing. 
In contrast to California, Ontario and Québec require opt-in facilities to have a minimum emissions 
level of 10,000 tonnes of CO2e. This effectively establishes a threshold for carbon pricing support in 
both provinces and poses the risk of incenting facilities falling below this threshold to increase their 
emissions in the short term. A facility can increase its emissions either by increasing its production, 
or in a much less desirable scenario, increasing its emissions intensity (that is, generating more 
greenhouse gas emissions per unit of output). 
The motivation to increase emissions stems from the lack of free allocations potentially creating 
a competitive disadvantage for smaller facilities with emissions falling below the eligibility 
thresholds. In particular, these facilities are likely to face increased costs associated with fuel 
consumption, passed down by fossil fuel distributors. Electricity price increases, however, are 
likely to be nominal as both Ontario and Québec generate the majority of their electricity from non-
fossil fuel sources. 
Last, Alberta’s minimum threshold for mandatory participation in its OBPS is 100,000 tonnes of 
CO2e per year. Opt-in participation is available to a facility of any size competing in an industry 
with at least one mandatory participant in the CCIR, or a facility in an EITE industry with 
emissions in excess of 50,000 tonnes of CO2e per year. With this approach Alberta arguably 
accomplishes both equity and efficiency objectives. First, it does not create any competitive 
disadvantages among facilities of different sizes in the same sector. Second, among smaller 
facilities in sectors not automatically covered by the CCIR, support is available only to those that 
are at risk of carbon leakage. 52 Facilities that do not receive free allocations — either because 
they are not eligible or do not opt in to the CCIR — will almost certainly face increased costs for 
fossil fuel purchases. The likely change in electricity prices, however, is less clear. Alberta is the 
only jurisdiction where all fossil fuel electricity generators are eligible for free allocations. While 
these allocations offset the increased cost to generators of supplying fossil-fuel electricity, there is 
52 With the minimum threshold of 50,000 tonnes of CO2e annually Alberta does risk, however, a similar situation to Québec 
and Ontario where a facility in an EITE industry not covered by the CCIR is incented to increase emissions above this 
threshold in order to receive support. 
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no requirement in the regulation that the value of the allocations gets passed down to consumers. 
Rather, the change in consumer prices will depend on the competitiveness of the electricity market.
CONCLUSIONS
The introduction of more stringent environmental policy — frequently in the form of pricing 
greenhouse gas emissions — carries with it the risk of posing negative competitiveness impacts 
on domestic firms and carbon leakage. As a result, domestic production declines while domestic 
emissions reductions are not fully realized on a global scale. Support for EITE industries can 
mitigate these impacts and is therefore a valid and needed component of climate policy packages in 
the absence of consistent and equivalent global action. 
Most of the jurisdictions we consider support EITE industries through free allocations that allow 
a facility to emit a certain amount of emissions at zero charge. There are a number of different 
components that determine the number of free allocations a facility is eligible to receive. The two 
most important, however, are typically an emissions-intensity benchmark for a facility’s product 
and a measure of a facility’s current or historical production. 
Our analysis identifies a number of best practices for defining the emissions-intensity benchmarks. 
First, standardized sector-level emissions-intensity benchmarks are preferable to facility-level 
benchmarks on efficiency and equity grounds, as they result in an equal subsidy per unit of 
output across all firms within a sector. They are also less administratively costly as there are 
fewer benchmarks to track and update over time. Second, looking ahead, it is preferable for the 
emissions-intensity benchmarks to have a tightening rate that is independent of current production 
and emissions. This ensures firms do not limit their current emissions reductions in order to gain 
higher free allocations in the future. 
The question of whether it is preferable to base free allocations on current or historical production 
can be answered by recalling that the goal of EITE support policies is to limit carbon leakage 
— preventing declines in output as a result of emissions pricing — while maintaining emissions 
reductions. In this, OBAs are more effective and more equitable than historical allocations as they 
only compensate facilities for what they actually produce, rewarding production and penalizing 
emissions. 
When designing EITE support policies it is also important for policy-makers to remember that free 
allocations come with distinct costs. First, there is the forgone revenue from emissions on which 
the carbon price is not paid. This is further compounded when considering governments have 
constrained or fixed budgets for EITE support. Too broad a definition of EITE will mean a greater 
reduction in revenues and more limited support being spread across more facilities and industries. As 
a result, industries at true risk of carbon leakage may not receive “adequate” support.53 Second, with 
OBAs, production will be higher than is optimal. This in turn results in either emissions or a carbon 
price that are higher than optimal. Additionally, when governments have constrained or fixed budgets 
for support, too broad a definition of EITE will mean support is spread across more facilities and 
industries, again resulting in industries at risk of leakage not receiving adequate support.
Appropriate targeting of EITE support policies has largely been overlooked in most jurisdictions. 
Even when the time has been taken to develop EITE definitions that distinguish sectors according 
to leakage risk, these definitions are generally either too broad or they are not applied in a way that 
will better target support policies to those industries at highest risk of carbon leakage. Rather, in 
virtually all jurisdictions, a facility’s current eligibility to receive EITE support tends to depend 
53 
We note that while the appropriate level of compensation is an important question, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
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more heavily on a basic accounting of its total annual emissions rather than on an assessment of its 
emissions intensiveness and trade exposure. 
There is a fine line for policy-makers between reducing carbon leakage and introducing additional 
costs into an economy as a result of EITE support policies. Unsurprisingly then, the design and 
implementation of EITE support policy is non-trivial. The effectiveness, efficiency and equity of 
the policy depend on two components — how the support is provided and where the support is 
targeted. If either is not given due consideration, then the EITE support policy is unlikely to lead 
to an efficient outcome. It is therefore essential for policy-makers to look at best practices within 
both components. This gives a jurisdiction the best opportunity to support industries at true risk of 
carbon leakage while maximizing the effectiveness of its climate change policy. 
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